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The Study of Life History: Gandhi! by David G. Mandelbaum I
LIFE PASSAGE AND LIFE HISTORY STUDIES
In their observation of the development of a person, anthropologists have used tWO main approaches: life passage studies and life history studies. Life passage (or life cycle) studies emphasize the requirements of society, showing how the people of a group socialize and enculturate their young in order to make them into viable members of society. Life history studies, in contrast, emphasize the experiences and require ments of the individual-how the person copes with society rather than how society copes with the stream of individuals. This difference in emphasis in anthro pological studies is also found in sociological and psychological studies. ' Comparisons of life passage events in different cultures have brought out certain general similarities (see, for example, Van Gennep 1960) ; even more, they have highlighted the vast differences among peoples in their methods and standards of socializa tion (see, for example, Mead 1928 Mead , 1935 Mead , 1970 . The life passage studies, in general, have made us aware of some constants in the life experience of man as a member of his species and of the enormous cultural variations that are possible in his experience as a member of his particular society (d. Richards 1970; Clausen 1968:47-48) . But these studies have not usu ally been concerned with the dynamic and adaptive aspects of the life experience, with the relations be tween one stage of life and the next, with the cumula tive patterns of personal conduct, with the relevance of personal experience to social institutions, and with the impact of personal choice on social change. Such questions are more likely to be raised by life history studies, those which follow the individual through the course of his career.
A life history is the account of a life, completed or ongoing. Such an account obviously involves some kind of selection, since only a very small part of all that the person has experienced can possibly be re corded. Certain salient facts about a person are likely to be recorded by any narrator, but much of any life history has to be chosen for inclusion according to some principles for selection. Often enough, such principles as are used are unstated or unwitting or inchoate. Most social scientists who have pointed out the great potential of the life history approach for their respective disciplines have seen as its chief dif ficulty the lack of accepted principles of selection, of suitable analytic concepts to make up a coherent frame of reference.
Three procedural suggestions are given here as a possible start for such a frame. The ideas of the dimensions, turnings, and adaptations in a life history may be useful as guidelines for the collection and analysis of life history data. These ideas are not intended to be inviolable classifications; nor are they substantive concepts, though using them may help us develop such concepts_ Their applicability is illustrat ed with the life history of Gandhi, whose life bears such intrinsic interest that, in this study as in other contexts, it has become something more than an illustration, has taken on, as it were, a life of its own.
LIFE HISTORY STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
The art of biography has long been cultivated by historians, and there is a considerable literature on the writing of biography for historians' purposes (d. I This study \\'as begun in the spring quarter of 1969 when I was associated with the Institute of Human Developmem. Univer+ sity of California, Berkeley. The help of the InstiLUte and its staff is gratefully ack.nowledged. Bibliographic assistance was most ably given by Kathryn Hansen.
2 Thus Smith (1968:276) has noted that the psychological study. of social competence should "keep in simultaneous view the twO perspectives that are differently emphasized by Inkeles and by Foot and Comell; that of society and its 'manpower' needs, and that of the person himself as the locus of humanistic values." Garraty 1957) . But the study of lives for purposes of social science has been more advocated than prac ticed. At one time the Social Science Research Council gave special attention to the use of life histories and of related personal documents (see Blumer 1939 , All port 1942 , Gottschalk 1945 , Kluckhohn 1945 , Angell 1945 . Other psychologists and sociologists have also given directives for the study of life history and have outlined programs for research (d. Park and Burgess 1924; BUhler 1933 BUhler , 1968a K. Young 1952; P. Young 1966; Becker 1966; Denzin 1970) . But not many have as yet done much recording and analysis of life histories as wholes. Longitudinal studies, nota bly those conducted in the Institute of Human Devel opment at the University of California, Berkeley, have yielded many significant observations of growth and social development, but these have yet to be placed in their social and cultural contexts.
Anthropologists have recorded life histories since the beginnings of the discipline. Many of these have been published (d. Langness 1965: 54-82 The stimulus to record them has been, I believe, not so much the outcome of a deliberate research plan as the result of a characteristic phase of the anthropologist's own life experience. When an an thropologist goes to live among the people he studies, he is likely to make some good friends among them. As he writes his account of their way of life, he may feel uncomfortably aware that his description and analysis have omitted something of great importance: His dear friends have been dissolved into faceless norms; their vivid adventures have somehow been turned into pattern profiles or statistical types.
This dilemma is not peculiar to anthropologists; in a way it is part of the human condition. Sapir (1949:590) once wrote that our natural interest in human behavior vacillates between what is imputed to the culture of the group as a whole and what is imputed to the psychic organization of the individual himself. In familiar circumstances and with familiar people, our interest usually centers on the individual. In unfamiliar circumstances and with unfamiliar roles, our perceptions are likely to be cultural rather than personal. "If I see my lillIe son playing marbles" [he wrote], "I do not, as a rule, wish to have light thrown on how the game is played. Nearly everything that I observe tends to be interpreted as a contribu tion to the understanding of the child's personality."
To redress the balance between these two perspec dves, a good many anthropologists have taken down the story of an informant's life. Radin (1913 Radin ( , 1920 Radin ( , 1926 was one of the first to give a rationale for doing so; his purpose was "to have some representative middle-aged individual of moderate ability describe his life in relation to the social group in which he had grown up " (1920:382) . Radin noted how difficult it was to get "an inside view of their culture" from informants (1920:383) and showed that a life history narrative could add much to an ethnological account.
Radin's footnotes tell a good deal about the culture and about the narrator, but there is almost no anal ysis. Although a main theme of Crashing Thunder's story is his quest for a good way of life, Radin's notes are more on the culture than on the society or per sonality, more on cultural patterns than on social or personal adaptation, more on descriptive presenta tion than on conceptual development (d. Lurie 1966:96-106 ). Dollard's (1935) Criteria for the Life History was a major attempt to provide some theoretical underpin ning for the use of life history data. Dollard formu lated seven criteria for the study of life histories, of which the first six sdpulate in various ways that the subject must be understood in his social and cultural context. The seventh is that "the life history material itself must be organized and conceptualized." Dollard recognizes that this is the crucial criterion. As he says, life history material does not speak for itself. But Dollard could then offer very lillle in the way of concepts or clues to organization.
Dollard's book reflected and also stimulated in creased interest in life histories, or at least in the kind of perspectives on human behavior that life histories might yield. When Kluckhohn (1945) surveyed the use of personal documents in anthropology, a num ber of life histories had recently been published or were in preparation. Boas, among others, had been dubious about their scientific value, and in one of his last papers, published posthumously in 1943, con cluded (p. 335) that "they are valuable rather as useful material for a study of the perversion of truth brought about by the play of memory with the pasl." But Kluckhohn's thorough and thoughtful survey reached very different conclusions. Kluckhohn recog nized the many problems of reliability, validity, and interpretation that are involved in the use of life histories, but saw their potential aavantages for stud ies of social change, as clues to implicit themes, as documentation on roles, as demonstration of social ization and enculturation, as an entry into under standing personality, as a view of the "emotional structure" of a way of life, as a means tovv'ard under standing variations within a society, and also of seeing the "common humanity" among peoples. Yet the use of life histories, as he appraised it in 1945, was more promise than actuality (p. 133): "Perhaps the most salient conclusion which emerged from our survey of published life history documents was the deficiency of analysis and interpretation." He added (p. 147) that personal documents had served as little more than interesting curiosities and that pitifully few new the OJ'etical questions had been asked of them.
The other surveys in the series sponsored by the Social Science Research Council came to similar con clusions. Allport's (1942) appraisal of the use of per sonal documents in psychology ended with a recom mendation that more conceptual, analytical work with such materials should be encouraged. Angell's (1945) review of sociological studies found that Thomas and Znaniecki's The Polish Peasant in Europe and America remained a monumental example of the method and that, while Blumer's (1939) appraisal of that work was relevant and stimulating, there had CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY been very litlie theoretical development of this field.
More than 20 years later, several updated reviews of the use of life history materials appeared. Becker (1966) , considering the state of such studies in soci ology, emphasizes the great importance of presenting the actor's subjective evaluations of his experiences and of giving the context in which he undergoes his social experience. He discusses the great potential of life history data as a wellspring for theory and as a means of testing concepts. He notes that such materi als offer basic evidence about social interaction and process, that they can provide a vivid feeling for what or for mass behavioral analysis in the manner of some political scientists. Yet a resurvey of the anthropologi cal use of life histories by Langness (1965) reveals little more development than has occurred in these other disciplines. Langness observes (p. 18), "Indeed, unfortunate as it seems, we can use virtually un changed the summary statements made by Kluck hohn in 1945." Many life histories were collected during the in tervening two decades, and a number of excellent narrative accounts were published. But though they give the reader some insight into the central figure and a feel for his society and culture, they add little to a body of general concepts. Few have much to offer in the way of analysis, but those few show the life history to be a rich, though still largely untapped, vein for anthropological investigation. Thus Aberle's (1951) analysis of Sun Chief (Simmons 1942) , the autobi ography of a Hopi Indian, sheds new light on such aspects of Hopi culture as witchcraft and illumines certain general problems such as the diversity of interpretation of the same culture by different ob servers. Mintz's (1960) fine life history of a Puerto Rican makes vividly clear, as few other anthropologi cal studies have done, the social factors and personal motivation that are involved in religious conversion.
The most extensive life history materials published in this period are those recorded on tape by Lewis and presented by him in a widely read series of books. In the introduction to his La Vida (1965), Lewis discusses the important concept of the culture of poverty, evidence for which he gained in considerable part from the autobiographies he collected in his studies of Mexican and Pueno Rican families. Lang~ ness (1965: 14) says that these are masterful accounts, but that Lewis's work "is almost exclusively descrip tive and irJ,volves very little in the way of analysis or 'problem-orientation.' "
The need for intellectual form in the study of life history was well expressed by Redfield (1955:56-65) . This approach, he noted, could show the social life of a community not only as a structure of interrelated parts but more as a "succession of added comprehen~ sions." It would raise new questions and problems, such as the changing states of mind in the span of a life, the prospective quality of a person's life, the influence of ideals on behavior, and the differences among what a man thinks ought to happen, what he expects to happen, and what he actually does. Such queries would bring the anthropologist to "the real and ultimate raw material" of his study; they would provide him with a direct means of examining social change. But they also involve the special difficulties of giving strong consideration to the people's modes of thought rather than assuming the more comfortable categories of the observer.
All these discussions of the use of life histories convincingly tell of the great potential benefits of the method and properly warn workers in this field of the precautions to be observed, but provide few guiding ideas for actually doing this research.
PROCEDURAL SUGGESTIONS
The jumbled, often profuse flow of data in a life hisLOry that an anthropologist collects has to be chan neled in some preliminary way before much analytic headway can be made with it. Three ways of doing so are suggested here beyond sheer chronological suc cession. They are in noting (I) the dimensions or aspects of a person's life; (2) the principal turnings and the life conditions between turnings; (3) the person's characteristic means of adaptation. The di mensions provide categories for understanding the main forces that affect a life. The turnings mark major changes that a person makes and thus demar cate periods of his life. A focus on adaptation directs our nOlice both to changes he makes and to continui ties he maintains through his life course.
DIMENSIONS
A dimension of a life history is made up of experi ences thal stem from a similar base and are linked in their effects on the person's subsequent actions. One such dimension is the biological, based on the in dividual's organic makeup and somatic development. Other distinguishable dimensions I have labelled the cultural, the social, and the psychosocial. To these must be added the unique, individual aspect of each life that is a basic consideration in life history study.
The biological dimension is the best documented for the human species as a whole. Each person's biological development has been broadly prepro grammed for him in the course of human evolution. Each one's programming is affected by his genetic constitution, and this differs among groups as well as among individuals, though the behavioral signifi cance of the group differences is far from clear. And in discussing biological development, the inclusive pronoun "he" must be put aside in some respects since the biological development of males and fe males differs both in timing and in kind.
The biological factors set the basic conditions for a life course; cultural factors mould the shape and content of a person's career. The cultural dimension lies in the mutual expectations, understandings, and behavior patterns held by the people among whom a person grows up and in whose society he becomes a panicipanl. Each culture provides a general scenario for the life course that indicates the main divisions, tells when transitions should be made, and imputes a social meaning to biological events from birth through death. Each scenario interprets and affects the biological dimension in its own way; each provides its own chan for the progress of a life.
This cultural life plan is more a schematic outline than a detailed code. Within this outline, more de tailed prescriptions of roles and behavior patterns are stipulated for particular sections of the society. These specifications commonly p'rovide options among which the individual can make some choice. Such narrower specifications and broader choices provide the individual with his principal guides to aClual social interrelations.
The social dimension of a life history includes the effective interplay and real relations in the course of which the actOrs may alter the roles, change the nature of the choices, and shift the cultural defini tions. So the cultural expectations for a life course may be revised in midcourse of actual lives. In focus ing on the social dimension, the observer studies those aClS of personal choice that are characteristic of the person's group and the common ways of working out the recurrent conflicts of life. Some of these regularities are recognized by the participants, others are not. The cultural and the social dimensions, as devices for analysis, often overlap, but the difference in em phasis is clear and the distinction seems to be analyti cally useful. The cultural dimension has to do with expectations and known forms shared by the people of a group \-\lith the cognitive and normative thought they have in common. The social dimension, in con trast, has to do with their social acts, conflicts, solu tions, and choices. It includes the emotional experi encing of reward and penalty and the outcome of action in maintaining or changing behavior patterns.
Within the study of the psychosocial dimension, the observer focuses on the individual's subjective world, his general feelings and attitudes. These are individu ally experienced, but each individual's subjective ex perience is likely to be similar, in some considerable pan, to that of others in his culture and society. Psychosocial development in the course of a life has been more extensively discussed than have character istic developments in the cultural and social aspects (ef. Buhler 1967:83-85 ). Freud's formulations pro vided a foundation for Erikson's (1964 Erikson's ( , 1968a influential scheme of the individual's development. Erikson outlines eight stages through which all per sons pass, each characterized by a panicular psycho logical encounter in which a person must somehow cope with opposing trends in himself. (In the earliest stage of infancy, for example, the encounter is be tween basic trust and mistrust [1968b:286-87] .)
The sequence, Erikson says, varies "in tempo and intensity" according to cultural and personal differ ences. This outline resembles a profile of biological development in that it is postulated as universal to the human species and the development is taken to be epigenetic. That is, the organism is seen as unfolding gradually in time and becoming more differentiated by cumulative stages.
The psychological dispositions listed in this se quence have to do with a person's general attitudes toward others and with his feelings toward and image of himself. The observer's emphasis in this view is on subjective response more than on biological capacity, on introspective feeling more than on prospective pattern, on generalized attitudes more than on social in teraction.
Other postulated sequences emphasize different psychological variables and deal mainly with the ear lier years of life. Piaget (1968) has contributed a long and important series of studies in which he and his colleagues have formulated stages of cognitive devel opment and of adaptive behavior. Kohlberg (1968) ha~ worked out a series of stages in the development of moral judgments. Loevinger (1966) 
has sketched
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY an overview of stages of ego development. Leighton and his colleagues have done extensive research in social psychiatry, taking a psychobiological approach and using life history materials (d. Leighton 1959). One contribution of this research is an extensive life history, with considerable analysis, of a Navaho Indi an (Leighton and Leighton 1949) . Important psycho logical studies on life history materials have been done by Buhler (1933) and Frenkel (1936) . More recently, Buhler (1962: I 08-9) has formulated a chart of basic psychological tendencies in the development of the self which shows the stage at which each tendency is particularly important (see also Buhler and Massarik 1968) .
These studies of psychosocial aspects have dealt mainly with persons from European or onh Ameri· can societies; the research methods used have been more those of clinic and questionnaire than of long term observation and direct recording in the context of reality. Their results should therefore be tested and amplified in the light of broader studies of life history.
Underlying all formulations about life develop ment is that aspect of a life history that is special and unique. Out of the study of individual lives, all life history generalizations are distilled. General concepts must be tested against individual experience. Yet a person's life cannot be neatly summarized and totally wrapped up in our generalizations, Simmons (1942:388) notes that each person is a creature and carrier of his culture, a manipulator in his society and also, even if only in a minute way, a creator of culture. While illuminating studies can be made about the conditions and limitations of creativeness in a society, each person's creativity cannot be fully accounted for by such studies.
This limitation to generalization is no more than the limit on all social research that abstracts common features from particular instances. But it becomes more poignantly apparent to those who try to study the whole life of a real person. And in the study of a life, the student tends to become especially aware of the person as an active doer and seeker and not only as a passive recipient or a subject for scientific gener alizations. Despite this ungeneralizable aspect of life history, cogent generalizations about a single account and comparative generalizations about many life his tories, across cultural lines, can usefully be made. The guideline of dimensions is one sorting device for doing so; the ideas of turnings and adaptations com· plement it.
TURNINGS
The principal periods of a life are marked by the main turnings, the major transitions, that the person has made. Such a turning is accomplished when the person takes on a new set of roles, enters into fresh relations with a new set of people, and acquires a new self·conception. The turning thus combines elements of three dimensions, the new roles being mainly cultural, the new interactions being social, and the new self-conception being psychosocial. A turning may occur through a single event or experience, a "turning point," or it may be a gradual shift. A marriage ceremony can be a turning point, while the shift from active adult to less active elder is often a gradual process. Some turnings are ascribed, others are more self-chosen. Certain turnings are quite ab solutely ascribed, for example-r entrance of every child into school in American society or early mar riage for girls in the community in which Gandhi grew up. Other turnings are left to family or in dividual choice. The manner of carrying out some turnings may be prescribed in detail; other turnings are more improvised. Some improvisation takes place even in a closely prescribed ritual such as a funeral or a wedding. Conversely, a person who improvises a turning in his life commonly follows some established patterns. A person's own view of the watersheds in his life may not exactly coincide with the significant turn ings that an observer may notice, but that view may nonetheless be important in the way in which he directs his life.
Anyone turning, then, may be relatively more ascribed or self-chosen, prescribed or improvised, quick or protracted, but each provides an index to the person's conduct after the turning. Once we under stand the major transitions we also know something about the main parts of his life, that is, about his salient roles, social relations, and self-conception from one transition to the nex t.
ADAPTATIONS
A life history develops over time, and so the parts entail periods of time. These periods are commonly drawn as segments along a curve, yet the depiction of a life as a trajectory, rising out of nothing, ascending to a zenith of something, and falling back to nothing, is not a very useful analogy. A life does not proceed in a projectable, unilinear curve like a cannon shot. Rather, it involves ongoing development in various spheres of behavior; it includes continuous adjust ment and periodic adaptation. Personal adaptations are both the source of social adaptation and also responses to It.
Adaptation is a built-in process, because every per son must, in the course of his life, alter some of his established patterns of behavior to cope with new conditions. Each person changes his ways in order to maintain continuity, whether of group participation or social expectation or self-image or simply survival. Some of these new conditions are imposed by his own physical development. Others arise from changing external conditions, whether of custom or climate, family or society.
Changes in behavior that remove particular stimuli to action have been labelled adjustments. Personal adaptations, by contrast, are changes that have major effect on a person's life and on his basic relations with others. Kluckhohn (1962) applied the term "adap tive" to behavior that contributed to the survival of the individual or the group.
Questions about adaptation in the study of a life history can be especially useful when an outline of the lUrnings and dimensions is available. We can then look to the main opportunities and limitations that the person faced at each juncture and ask how and why the person adapted his behavior (or failed to do so) at this point, what he tried to change and what he tried to maintain.
These brief definitions of dimensions, turnings, and adaptations in life history study will have to be amplified as they are used in specific studies. To illustrate some potential uses, I turn to the life history of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who was born on October 2, 1869 and fell to an assassin's bullets on January 30, 1948. I n the course of those 78 years the turnings of his life had much to do with some major turnings in the history of the people of India and perhaps, some say, with the future course of other peoples as well.
I I

GANDHI'S LIFE HISTORY AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
vVhy begin with Gandhi? There are certain manifest advantages. Many able scholars and writers have con tributed to the study of Gandhi; they offer a variety of approaches for viewing his career. Moreover, my own interest in him has grown in recent years, partly as I have learned more about his cultural background and social milieu, partly because of the current trend of world affairs, for which some of his concepts may be both relevant and revolutionary.
I saw Gandhi only once, at the railway station in Madras City in 1937. The station and the streets around it were thick with throngs of people waiting to demonstrate their allegiance to him and, in the Indi an way, to take darshan, to acquire a bit of supernal merit through a glimpse of--even better, a touch of-the revered leader. He was duly greeted and garlanded by the notables who received him; there were, as I recall, enthusiastic shouts and a good deal of jostling for vantage as his procession passed by, but the general feeling was of worshipful respect rather than of political arousal. The power of his charisma lay thick upon the crowd.
Soon after that, I read his autobiography again and still later met and talked briefly about him with his son, Devadas. 3 I was intrigued by him as a person and as a social force but also put off by some of his assumptions and procedures, so I was not then at tracted to try to understand more about him. But as I learned more about his society and civilization and read more about his life and times, particularly in the writings of Bose (1953 Bose ( , 1966 and of Erikson (1966 Erikson ( , 1968c Erikson ( , 1969 , I became increasingly interested in working out some of the main themes in his life and 3 I was in India when Gandhi's wife, Kasturba, died. The newspaper accounts o.f their relationship that 1 read then led me to r.emark III a Ictter (wnacn on February 25, 1944) that a study of his bfc we,tuld bt; 3nthropologicall.y fascinating if he had done no more lhan Sil all hiS days before a pile of cloth in a bazaar shop. With the effeCt he had on all of the people of India, I thought, his story should become a c1O;ssic case in psychology and anthropology. t82 influence. My renewed interest led me to search out and talk with one of his grandsons and with a distant kinsman and also to discuss his impact with a few of those who had known him well.
The advantages of studying Gandhi for the pur poses of life history analysis are considerable, but so are the disadvantages. His experiences are as fully documented, his thoughts and deeds as voluminously recorded, even his personal habits and whims as meticulously detailed as any man's have been in human history. He wrote a great deal during his 20s, and in the last 40 years of his life he systematically wrote every day. The 32d volume of his Collected Works appeared in 1969; it covers his writings of the year 1926. A total of more than 50 volumes is planned. He wrote his autobiography to "tell the story of my numerous experiments with truth," including personal motives and failings as well as public aims and accomplishments (1957:xii). There was lillIe or nothing in his life that he wanted to keep private. He insisted on describing in detail, and frequently in writing, everything about himself from his peristalsis to his political dilemmas. He often presented himself in his writings as a case history from which he as well as others could learn.
Moreover, his life and work have been studied from many different approaches. I have mentioned the contributions of the anthropologist Bose and the psychoanalyst Erikson. To list just a few others, there are the works by the sociologist Unnithan (1956) , by the historian and former member of the Indian Civil Service Moon (1969) , by the political scientists Ru dolph and Rudolph (1967) and Bondurant (1965) . and by the writers Nanda (1968) and Ashe (1968) . There are Tendulkar's (1960) eight-volume bi ography and three large biographical tomes by his longtime associate Pyarelal (1956 Pyarelal ( , 1958 Pyarelal ( , 1965 . Gandhi was made known to a wide public in Europe and America through a number of writings about him beginning in the 1920s, particularly through a book by Rolland (1924) . In the centenary year of his birth, 1969, there was a freshening of the flow of writing about him-the large book of essays edited by Biswas (1969) is one of several important contribu tions-and there is no sign that the flow will soon end.
The very bulk of text and commentary presents a formidable task to the enquirer. If the record is full, it is in some ways overfull. It is not easy to see Gandhi in a fresh view, without influence of one or another of the notions that have become common. For students from other societies, who have not known Gandhi either as charismatic presence or as official icon, it is not easy to sift the tales and testimonies, to distinguish the real man from the genuine myth. Even the man ner of referring to him has come to carry certain connotations, at least in India. The respectful affectionate suffix is usually used when he is referred to, as Gandhiji rather than JUSt as Gandhi, and omit ting it may imply some reason for nOt using the respectful form. And, as frequently happens to the memory of a founding father, disciples build up an aura and canonical lore at which detraclOrs arise to scoff.
These conditions are not uncommon in historical-biographic research. The more serious research ques tion for our present purposes is whether the life history of so singular a man can be a useful source for general concepts about method, culture, society, per· sonality. No person can be labelled "typical" in all respects, and students of life history must always grapple with the question of the typicality of their subjects (d. Aberle 1951:11&-19) . As a renowned leader, Gandhi is by definition atypical. He was strongly aware of his uniqueness, or at least of highly unusual aspects of his conduct. Most of the critical turnings in his life after the age of 19 were self chosen, and much of his role behavior was self created. This was far from typical, particularly for a person of his society and culture.
Yet throughout his unique career he evoked ideas and emotions so deeply characteristic of his coun trymen that millions of them recognised in him their own deep-rooted feelings. In some ways, too, his methods typified those used by religious reformers and social innovators in India before him as well as after. Like all other men, he was both typical and atypical, though each in an uncommon degree. But the examination of his life history does offer some especially good vistas for our study of life history in general.
Gandhi lived successively in four geographic areas, and it happens that the years he spent in each include a major turning and mark a principal phase of his career. The first phase covers the years of his devel opment up to the age of 19 in the Kathiawad region of the present state of Gujaral. His birthplace and childhood home was Porbandar, a small seaport town on the northwestern coast of India. When he was seven, his family moved to Rajkot, an inland town 120 mi. from Porbandar and also the seat of a little princely state. There he went through primary school and high school and spent one term in a college at Bhavnagar. Then he had three intensive, critical years as a student in England. After a brief stay back in India he went to South Africa, where he worked as a lawyer and political leader from his 23d to his 43d year. On his final return to India from South Africa he made his home in Gujarat, but he quickly became a national leader and the scene of his work took in all of India, far beyond the Kathiawad towns of his youth.
Within each of these four periods he made other turnings, bUl the others can best be subsumed, I believe, in the four major periods. One exception may be the turning he was beginning to make in the last months of his life, when he worked, mainly in Bengal, at reconciling Hindus and Muslims. He seemed to be taking on new roles, social relations, and perhaps a revised self-conception in his 77th and 78th years, though he was nOl given time to develop this potential turning in his life. 4 In each period he be came something other than he had been before; in each he made a turning that developed out of his previous experience.
• (1965: 12 ) that Gandhi's energy was phenomenal: "He could go on working day after day and week after week with only three or four hours of sleep-some times without any sleep at all." His elder sister re membered that when he was very young, he "was restless as mercury, could not sit still even for a Iit~le while"; she and the maid, who also looked after him, had to be alert constantly because of his locomotor energy (Pyarelal 1965: 194-95) . To the end of his life, Gandhi could command the energy that the great tasks he set for himself required. Without such bio logical capacity, he might not have been inclined to say, as he often did, "God never appears to you in person but always in action" (d. Erikson 1969:93, 108; Rudolph and Rudolph 1967:22&-29) .
Gandhi was much concerned with his own physi ology, particularly with what he ate and when and how, and he liked to give advice to others about their personal biology. In pan this was a reflection of the general concern with biological functions in orthodox Hindu circles. The people among whom Gandhi was reared assumed that the social rank of a person's group was a central element in his life, and this rank depended in part on what and how each member ate and how he controlled other biological functions. Gandhi created his own intense version of these con cerns, but the concerns are in the cultural and per sonal domains rather than in the biological.
His development along the cultural dimension dur ing his first 19 years followed quite faithfully the life plan expected for one of his varna category, of his jati (the endogamous group usually termed caste or sub caste), and of his family. He was born into the third of the four varnas of Hindu scripture, the Vaishya, whose occupations are supposed to be in trade, with some allowance, especially in Kathiawad, for other occupations such as government service. Their tradi tional style is more in the quietist, ritualistically ob servant mode than in the more activist warrior-ruler tradition of the Kshatriya category or in the priestly learned mode of the Brahmin groups. Men of all these three higher categories should, according to scriptural precepts, pass through the life stages of student, householder, and (in two phases) religious recluse. Like other grand schemes of scripture, this four-stage plan is seldom followed literally, but it does provide some general notions of how a life should proceed. One such notion is that quite different life styles are appropriate to different times of life-an idea that Gandhi once emphasized in a letter to his son Manilal (Pyarelal \965:207 (Toothi 1935; Enthoven \922:423; Pyarelal 1965: 178-79) .
The traditional life plan prescribed for Modh Vanias, or indeed for anyone in the higher jatis, allowed for little self-choice. When Gandhi was grow ing up, a Modh Vania boy had no say about whom he should marry and when; he had little option about his life's work; he did not get much opportunity to assert an individual identity until quite late in his life. Not long out of boyhood a Modh Vania youth was mar ried; Gandhi was 13 at his wedding. Marriage being a central event for the family and the jati, it was thought much too important to be decided by young sters. The prospective bride and groom were only informed about their impending union, not con sulted.
One of the first occasions when a man could openly make decisions about his own life course came when it was time for his own child to be married. The kind of match he could arrange reRected on his personal prestige as well as on the social standing of his family in the jati. He was expected to negotiate, to manage, to manipulate in order to make a match that would do him credit. All the resources of wealth and power that he had been building in previous years could now be used to the advantage of his personal reputation as well as that of his family.
Another choice typically came after the death of his father. Then a man felt strong pressure, sooner or later, to set up a household with his own wife and children, to separate physically and legally from the joint family they shared with his brothers and their wives and children. In the end the decision was typically reached to make the break, but the process of arriving at it was often turbulent and troubled (d. Mandelbaum 1970: \25-30) .
Both these major choices would normally confront a man when he was in his 30s or older. There were, in addition, two other kinds of choice, one having to do with religion and the other with social status. Both were important in Gandhi's family background.
In religion, a man or woman had some leeway to choose a panicular deity for special devotion or to join with one of the Hindu cults or sects for style of worship. A person could also choose to be especially stringent in religious observance. Gandhi's mother came from a family that belonged to an eclectic sect whose founders had sought to reconcile Hinduism and Islam. She remained eclectic in her beliefs and was very stringent in her religious practices (Gandhi 1957:4-5,33; Pyarelal 1965:213-\4) . The other op tions had to do with advancing the status of one's family within the jati and of one's jati in the local socia! system. Men could feel justified in choosing ne\'J roles and occupations if these might result in advancement.
One of Gandhi's ancestors, six generations before him, had given up trade (presumably that of grocer, as the name implies) and had become an official of the Rana's government. Gandhi's grandfather, his fa ther's brother, and his father had further raised the reputation of the family by becoming chief ministers in small princely states (Porbandar State had a popu lation of 72,077 in \872; Rajkot State had 36,770). The actual rewards of high office in a little place were not enormous, as is attested by the fact that in Por bandar during Gandhi's childhood his whole fam ily-the First Minister, his wife, and four children -lived in a room measuring 19 ' /2 ft. by \3 ft. with an attached kitchen "in which hardly two persons could comfortably sit" (Pyarelal 1965: 191; P. Gandhi 1957:4-5) . Nevertheless, the family had become a prominent one in its jati and in the principality.
Gandhi's father had held his position for 27 years, even though he had little formal education and less English. But he apparently realized that if one of his sons were thereafter to hold a comparable position, under the tightened control of British officials, he would have to have an education in English, possibly even in England (d. Pyare!al 1965:184) . In the \880s few Modh Vania boys had so far departed from the traditional life plan as to undergo an English educa tion. To go to England and inevitably to be ritually defiled there was, in the views of influential elders of the jati, a cause for outcasting.
When Gandhi was ready to take that critical step,
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his father had died, but his eldest brother, as head of the family and responsible for its welfare, supported and financed the move. (1957:39) . The objections of some of the jati elders were also formidable. They tried to block his plans in several ways and in the end the elders in Bombay formally cast him out of the jati. Gandhi made his way around the obstacles they set up and was not deterred by the oUlcasling, the most dire punishment at their disposal.
Up until the time of his decision to go, Gandhi's life experiences had been much like those of other youths of similar jati and family, of that time and culture. His family's social position had modified the usual Modh Vania life plan by providing an opening toward high er edu.;ation. In high school, Gandhi acquired enough command of English and enough academic knowledge to open a way for him to vastly expanded social horizons. And in high school he made friends with classmates of other jatis than his own.
Outwardly Mohandas Gandhi had followed quite a normal cultural progression for one of his jati and a normal social development for a son of an eminent family. What his development was like inwardly, in the psychosocial dimension, Gandhi himself de scribed at some length in his autobiography and elsewhere. This record has been ably discussed by Pyarelal, Erikson, and the Rudolphs, among others. But since there are so few comparable testimonies it is difficult to know whether Gandhi \vas as characteristic in this respect as he was in the cultural dimension. My own impression is that he \vas-that at age 19 he was quite similar, in his psychological makeup, to other young men of his culture and class.
Each cultural life plan has both explicit and implicit consequences for psychosocial development. One who was raised in Gandhi's cultural environment could scarcely avoid having explicit concern with such things as his ingestion and other bodily processes, with the importance of avoiding pollution, with the value of asceticism and the counterpart disvalue of some of the sensual satisfactions. Even if the person later rejected some of these taboos, as Gandhi reject ed the idea that there were Untouchables, his whole Mandelbaum: THE STUDY OF LIFE HISTORY: GANDHI inner sensitivity had been moulded by the external insistences of those who trained him while he was young.
The explicit impress began in earliest infancy. The ritual of childbirth presaged the themes that would be repeated for a child constantly and intensively during his childhood. Mother and infant were secluded for 40 days, debarred from normal..-elations because they were considered to have been made vulnerable by the very experience of parturition. Their diet, their movements, their contacts were closely regulated until society deemed them to be rid of the birth pollution and fit for the company of family and friends (Enthoven 1922:416-17 ; see also Mandel baum 1970: 186) . Thereafter the child fearned over and over that what he ate, where he went, whom he touched had electric effect on his own goodness or badness and might even endanger the status of those who loved him. As a child Gandhi teased about these matters, in the way he later liked to tease his friends. His sister recalled that Moniya (his childhood nati'\e) would tell his mother that he had just touched ah Untouchable and then, on being questioned, laugh and deny it (Pyarelal 1965: 195) . Though asa child he might tease about these touch taboos and in later years abjure them entirely, as a mature man he upheld much of the ethic concerning purity and pollution that he had absorbed as a child.
CRITICAL ROLES AND CONVENTIONAL TURNINGS OF YOUTH
A life plan also has implicit consequences for the person's social and psychosocial development. In Gandhi's case, the implicit forces became especially significant in connection with three roles that he played from ages 13 to 17, between his marriage and the death of his father. One of these roles was thrust upon him, that of husband; another he chose and maintained against his family's opposition, that of friend to a Muslim youth; the third was intensified by circumstances, that of devoted, nursing son to his ailing, failing father. The results of each encounter, Gandhi attested, deeply affected his lifelong attitudes.
In the brief chapter of the Autobiography entitled "Playing the Husband" Gandhi tells how he began his married life. TVJO aspects of the marriage are re ported; one concerns the "devouring passion" of his sexuality, the other his efforts to dominate his wife, Kasturbai. (Kasturba is the more respectful, matronly form of her name.) In sexual matters, Gandhi's views in his mature years paralleled the precepts of Hindu scripture, though he followed them far more literally and rigorously than did most other Hindus. In the matter of marital dominance, his inclinations seem to have been quite characteristic of young husbands in that society.
Gandhi noted that in their sexual relations, Kas turbai was never "the temptress," She was illiterate, and he was anxious to teach her, "but lustful love left me no lime." He says that he was saved from "the disasters of lustful love" by the custom that a young couple were not allowed to remain together for long. During the first five years of their marriage, Kas turbai was a\vay from him periodically in her parents' home for about twO years. After that came his years in England, and on his return they were also not con tinually together. "Then came the call from South Africa and that found me already fairly free from the carnal appetite" (1957:13-14, 205) .
He went to South Africa in 1893, when he was 23. Their four sons were born between 1888 and 1900. Increasingly he relinquished sexual relations, and in 1906, when he was 37, he finally took the vow of celibacy that he kept for the rest of his life. Celibacy, after the householder stage, is in the scriptural plan for the proper ages of man, though Gandhi never sought to become the totally withdrawn religious recluse which that plan proposes.
A young couple of the Modh Vanias, as in the higher jatis generally, began their marital relations at a relatively early age within a household where there was strong denigration of the couple's sexual interest in each other (ef. Madan 1965: 134-37 ). Gandhi's first years of marriage followed this pattern, and he emerged from them with characteristic attitudes about sexual relations. He later wrOte that a husband should avoid privacy with his wife because "the only possible motive for privacy between husband and wife is the desire for sexual enjoyment," He became unshakably convinced that love and lust go illtogeth er, that love begins where lust ends (1957:278; 1958:56; Pyarelal 1965:204-5 ). This facet of Gandhi's belief may puzzle some today; but in the 1880s, in a Modh Vania household in a Kathiawad town, there were no recognized alternatives to the assumptions about sex and marriage that Gandhi accepted.
Of his struggle "to make good my authority as a husband" (1957: 13), Gandhi wrOte that he insisted that Kasturbai should not go anywhere without his permission, and she equally insisted that she could visit the temple or friends as she liked. He was most eager to teach her to read and write, but she was not an eager or successful pupil. There were quarrels, and he felt thwarted and defeated in these efforts.
Since both were 13 at their marriage, Kasturbai would have been more mature physically for several years, and this would not have been to Mohandas's advantage. "In spite of all my pressure," he wrote (1960:v) , "she would do as she wished."
We must note, however, that her scope for doing as she wished was exceedingly limited. A young wife of that society could do very little on her own. Within the household she was under the strict supervision of her mother-in-law. Whenever an older male came in view she had to cover her face, and in general she had to make herself as inconspicuous as she could. She could not venture beyond the house compound alone except perhaps, as Kasturbai did, to go to the temple or to the nearby homes of friends and relatives.
Yet Mohandas wanted to exert dominance even over the narrow choices available to Kasturbai. It may be that this also reAects a characteristic, though im plicit, inclination. H is whole society was hierarchically stratified; the question of who was dominant and who subordinate in social interaction was a prevalent and critical one. Even in family relations, for example, among brothers, rivalry regularly appeared even though there was supposed to be none (ef. Pyarelal 1965: 193; Mandelbaum 1970:63-66) . In the wedding ceremony of Vanias of Gujarat there is a symbolic enactment of the struggle for dominance between husband and wife. At one point the couple sit before the family deity in the bride's home and playa guessing game of odds and evens with coins. The very last rite of the wedding is a seGand playing of the same game, but before the family deity in the bride groom's house. "Luck in this game is an omen of luck in the game of life. The winner of the game will be the ruler of the house." (Enthoven 1922:420-21 ; see also Nathubhai 1893:389; 1900).
Although a young wife lVas required to give every sign of deference to her husband in the presence of others, that evidently did not obviate the possibility that she might exercise some control over him in private. Certainly the elders of a joint family were commonly concerned about that possibility. Perhaps some young husbands, at long last in a relationship in which they should be securely dominant, felt a deep chagrin that even in this role their dominance was not entirely firm. Perhaps also this helped them to feel that one could never get enough social dominance or that the usual quest for social dominance was pan of a game they could never securely win. Whatever may have been the psychological outcome of such en counters for others, Gandhi later thought that his early tussles with Kasturbai had impressed him with the power of nonviolence (Nanda 1968:21; Pyarelal 1965:205) .' But he was able to learn from her exam ple only later.
The second of the significant roles in these years was that of best friend. This relationship was not in the cultural life plan at all. Friendship is a voluntary bond; Vania expectations neither preclude nor pre scribe it. There is a vague presumption among Indian villagers and townspeople that one's friends should be kinsmen or jati fellows. But high-school boys are likely to meet a wider range of their age· mates than uneducated boys meet, and classmates, of whatever jati, are united as fellow sufferers and allies against the tribe of teachers. Gandhi's friends in the Alfred High School in Rajkot in 1881 were of various jatis, and his best friend was a Muslim, Sheikh Mehtab. Under the heading "A Tragedy," Gandhi recounts the evil ways into which his friend led him, among them vicious suspicions about his wife, and concludes, "Whenever I think of those dark days of doubts and suspicions, I am filled with loathing of my folly and lustful cruelty, and I deplore my blind devotion to my friend " (1957:25) . That devotion influenced his psy chosocial development, perhaps in a way that was characteristic of other youths also.
Sheikh Mehtab was a classmate of Gandhi's elder brother. When his brother, his mother, and his wife warned him that he was in bad company, Gandhi :!> tOl thal he suddenly dropped his attempts to direct her or that she quickly acceded to all his directives. Even when both were 72 years old and in prison together, he set aside time each day to teach her "Gujarati, Gita, geography and sometimes history." By then she was more amenable but less leachable (Nayar 1960:45).
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admitted his friend's "weaknesses" but pled, "He cannot lead me astray, as my association with him is meant to reform him " (1957: 19) . But as it turned out, the would-be reformer was himself caught up in a different kind of reform. Anti-British feeling was rising; high-school boys were excited by it. They seized the idea that Englishmen were physically su perior because they ate meat and so Indians too should eat meat 1O increase their strength and there by become powerful enough LO wrest their country's independence (Pyarelal 1965:209-10) . Mehtab, whose family and kin had no compunctions about eating meat, induced Mohandas Gandhi, whose fam ily and kin had the strongest revulsion against doing so, to share half a dozen "meat-feasts" with him. Mohanrlas was so uneasy about lying to his parents about this that he soon forswore any more experi ments of the kind. Mehtab also arranged for another experiment, with a prostitute, though Gandhi, as he relates, was saved from this iniquity through the grace of being struck helpless, presumably by fear. Finally, Mehtab diligently fanned the flames of Gandhi's suspicions of his wife.
The autobiography mentions other boyhood mis deeds. With a young kinsman he secretly tried smok ing. With his brother he sold a piece of gold clipped from an armlet, lied about it lO his parents, then confessed in writing to his father and felt the joy of confession and forgiveness. There was no confession of the unconfessable escapades with Mehtab and no cleansing absolution. The friendship was evidently not a smooth and easy one; in describing the events JUSt before his departure for England, Gandhi says, "I was always quarreling with my friend Sheikh Mehtab" (1958:6) .
Why, then, did he keep up the friendship? Gandhi mentions his admiration of his friend's athletic ability and bravery. Erikson (1969: 135) gives an insightful answer: ". . Mehtab played perfectly the personage on whom to project one's personal devil and thus became the personification of Mohandas' negative identity, that is, of everything in himself which he tried to isolate and subdue and which yet was pan of him." Through Mehtab, Mohandas could test some of the fundamentals of his culture to find out for himself what they really meant to him. The quarreling may well have been part of the continual testing of modes of social relations as well as of cultural verities.
The testing of limits-limits of precept and of self-is common in male adolescents in many, per· haps all, societies. For Mohandas Gandhi and for some of his contemporaries, that personal testing overlapped a wider testing of political and cultural realities. Reform was in the air. Speaking at a send-off party in his honor at the high school on July 4, 1888, he urged other boys to follow him and "to work wholeheartedly for big reforms in India" (1958:2). But it was not until his South African years that he found out what kind of reformer he wanted to be.
Mohandas came away from ·his adolescent ex peri. menting unalterably convinced of the validity of the taboos he had tested. Though the friendship was not culturally prescribed and the testing was not socially sanctioned, this may have been the common upshot
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Mandelbaum: THE STUDY OF LIFE HISTORY: GANDHI of a young man's testing in the Kathiawad of Gandhi's youth, as it has been in other places and in others' times of youth. 6 The third of the critical roles in his youth was that of son to his father. Gandhi tells how a drama about a son's extreme devotion to his parents left an "indel ible impression" on his mind. His account of stealing and then confessing to his father ends with the words that the confession "increased his affection for me beyond measure " (1957:28) .
His father had suffered injuries on the way to Mohandas's wedding (or so Gandhi later remem bered), when the coach in which he was travelling overturned, and for the three years from then until his death he was sick and steadily declining. During those years Gandhi helped to nurse him; it was a kind of service he valued then as he did in his later life. But, as he tells in the chapter "My Father's Death and My Double Shame," on the "dreadful night" he had been massaging his father when his uncle relieved him. Gandhi went straight to his bedroom and woke his wife with his "animal passion." Within a few minutes came a knock at the door and the word that his father was dead. The shame of having left his dying father and having done so because of "carnal desire," Gandhi wrote, "is a blot that I have never been able to efface or forget ... " (1957:30-31) .
That experience and its consequences have been discussed most illuminatingly by Erikson (1969: 128) , who points out that the episode resembles similar encounters in the lives of other spiritual innovators. Erikson calls it "the curse," a charge incurred in childhood or youth that can never be settled and that remains felt as an unpaid debt through all the rest of a lifetime. While the blot is presented in the autobi ography as the result of a single episode, it probably is, in the clinical term, a "cover memory," a condensa· tion and projection of a long·term conflict in one dramatic scene.
This conflict rises out of a man's common dif ficulties in being a son to his father during his shift from childhood to manhood. It is part of the charac teristic human dilemma that Erikson (p. 132) calls the generational complex because "it derives from the fact that a man experiences life and death-and past and future-as a matter of the turnover of genera tions." A man is apt to face questions of his own relation to time and tradition, of his separate identity, through encounters with his father. This common encounter and dilemma are generally included under the label of Oedipus Complex, though the usual connotations of that term are to the infantile and neurotic aspects of the experience rather than to the constructive and existential aspects. The interesting question, Erikson observes, is how Gandhi, like other 6 Disillusionment with friends was charaeteriSlic of (he men Carstairs ( highly uncommon men, could reenact this existential curse in a way that many of his countrymen could understand and use for socially constructive pur· poses.
Though Gandhi was to become a highly uncom mon man, at the time of his father's death and in his response to it he was not so uncommon.
7 Gandhi's relations with his father were quite within the usual expectations of his society. Among the Modh Vanias, as among the higher jatis generally, a father is sup posed to receive utmost respect from his son and to command his obedience through most of the son's life. A son is duty-bound, dharma-directed, to be deferent always to his father in word and deed. As a youth Gandhi followed this pattern faithfully and seems to have taken it even more seriously than most others did. He was deeply shaken by his lapses from a son's dutiful conduct. He wrote that when his father forgave him upon his confession of theft, he took it then as an expression of his father's love, "but today f know that it was pure Ahimsa." His own confession showed, he later reAected, the power of truth; his father's response showed the power of ahimsa, nonvi· olence. And his shameful behavior at the time of his father's death demonstrated to him that he had to struggle always to free himself from "the shackles of lust" (1957: 28, 31) . Rudolph and Rudolph (1967: 205-7) conclude that the circumstances of his father's death "moved Gandhi toward celibacy and the consensual mode." They go on to explain cogently that when Gandhi spoke of each person's imperative need to control his "carnal self" he meant not only sexual desire but also hatred and anger. And he took his own relations with his father, as he vividly recalled them, as prototypical lessons to be applied over a vast scene of history and society. These lessons concerned ways of handling authority, lovingly but effectively; they were not about ways of of mitigating the pervasive deference of son to father. Gandhi's relations \vith his father (and with his mother also) reinforced for him the traditional norms about this relationship, just as his experiences as husband and as friend bolstered in him attitudes that were common in his society.
In all, Gandhi's life course in Kathiawad up to the age of 19 had produced a young man who was quite typical of his region, his jati, his class. Looking ahead to the career he was to make, we can detect that he was different in some crucial ways, but the future Mahatma was scarcely visible to the young Mohandas Gandhi who sailed for England in 1888. When he was asked in an interview in 1891 why he had come to England to study law, he answered, "In a word, ambition " (1958: 53) .
The turnings he had made up to then were largely those specified by his culture and inherent in his 7 Erikson mentions that in his discussion with informants who had been among Gandhi's associates and followers, some of them spontaneously offered revelations about their own lives. One theme that came up in these recollections was of "a deep hurl which the informant had inflicted on one of his parents or guardians and could never forget. .." . Perhaps there was some cultural and social confluence that imprinted this kind of painful memory on a good many other men in India as well as on Gandhi.
188 society.We can say little about his development in terms of the epigenetic stages formulated by Erikson, since Erikson himself mentions such stages only in cidentally in his long, clarifying look at Gandhi's life (cf. Erikson 1969: 180) . We do have Gandhi's own testimony about the critical effect on him of his roles as son, friend, and husband. His enactment of these roles, together with his less-mentioned role as stu~ dent, helped to transform him from a child to a young man. The rebellious gestures he made may have been characteristic, though implicit, means through which a young man came around to main taining the ways and values of his fathers.
These values were largely the values expressed in religion. But there were other values also involved, values that were societal, such as those concerning status advancement, and are not formally prescribed in the sacred texts. In Gandhi's case, as we have seen, this meant an opening to English culture that became a passage to England itself. His development in the next phase of his life depended not only on what he found available to him in the new milieu but also on the constraints-or better, the parameters of ac tion-that he brought with him from the previous environment. Out of his experiences in the next three years, he revised some of these parameters and cre ated fresh opportunities for his subsequent develop ment.
THE INNOVATIVE ADAPTATION IN ENGLAND
The youth who sailed from Bombay on September 4, 1888 was a very provincial student. Gandhi tells that he was unable to understand spoken English readily, that he had never read a newspaper, that he was "innocent of the use of knives and forks." On his arrival in England an Indian friend had to instruct him on such points of English etiquette as not to touch other people's things at first sight, not to ask personal questions at first acquaintance, not to talk loudly ever (1957:42, 44, 47) .
The young man who returned to Bombay on July 5, 1891 was a cenified barrister, potentially a member of the professional classes by virtue of his education and in fact a young man of metropolitan experience and cosmopolitan interests. He was quite uncertain of his future, but he had qualified himself for a wide potential achievement. He had made a major turn ing, away from the life plan of his Kathiawad society and toward some career line for an English-educated lawyer in I ndia. Thereafter his roles were largely self-chosen and self-defined, his life plan self wrought. The kind of personal adaptation he began to make in England was one for which there were few precedents.
The continuity with which he was preoccupied from the day he set foot on the ship to England was that of keeping his vow to his mother. Whether to eat meat, how to manage as a strict vegetarian, were the main questions. He had been deluged with advice on this while he was preparing for the voyage. Most of his advisers said that he would not be able to do Without meat In the cold climate. He himself had not been sure he would be able to do so; but when he found himself in the totally alien world of the ship, his resolve stiffened (1958:61) .
The question did not fade after his arrival. The impression one gets from his writing of that time and from his later recollection is that he brought up the subject of his diet with most of the people with whom he talked. With an Indian friend he had long discus sions about the necessity of eating meat. To all the questions about diet that he himself raised, to all the counterarguments that friends and acquaintances proposed, he reached one final answer: "A vow is a vow-it cannot be broken" (1957:47) . The vow was a continuous tie to his mother and motherland; he would not relinquish it nor relinquish his continuous concern with il. And he would thereafter come back repeatedly to the stand of being helpless to change his course once he had arrived at a moral position.
He had no difficulty about another pan of his vow, abstaining from wine, and only passing embarrass ment about the third element, women (1957:64-66, 70-71) .
Not long after his arrival in London, his dietary determination brought him, happily, to a fine circle of friends, to exciting cultural discoveries, and to a reassuring personal solution. He discovered a vege tarian restaurant where he not only enjoyed the first hearty meal since his arrival but also found a book, Plea for Vegetarianism, by Henry Salt. This book showed him that he could be a vegetarian through rational, intellectual choice and not only because of filial obedience and cultural ascription, Its arguments demonstrated that at least this basic value of his Indian tradition was supported by some Westerners and advocated through modern, even scientific, Western arguments. Gandhi thereafter saw himself as a vegetarian by choice, exponent of a felicitous com bination of Indian tradition and modern thought. The spread of vegetarianism, he recalled, "hencefor ward became my mission " (1957:48) .
Later, Gandhi was elected to be a member of the Executive Committee of the London Vegetarian Soci ety, and this brought him in contact with the leaders of the vegetarian movement. Vegetarianism, for many of them, was only one aspect of a larger move ment of reform and renaissance. Some of them were politically engaged in socialist activities, others worked for particular programs of reform such as women's rights and birth control (cf. Winsten 1951; Gandhi 1957:59-60; Pyarelal 1965:238-71) .
The vow had given him an entry into effervescent intellectual circles and a supportive social sphere; he developed other resources as well. He carried on his formal studies as only a student of extraordinary energy, intelligence, and dedication could do. He quickly found out that the bar examinations were relatively easy and would not take up all the time that he was required to stay in England in order to be admitled to the Bar. For about three months he "undertook the all toO impossible task of becoming an English gentleman." He bought an expensive hat and suit and began taking lessons in dancing, French, elocution, and the violin. But these efforts palled and He decided to sit for the London matriculation examination even though that meant passing univer sity-level examinations in Latin, French, and other subjects he had not studied in India. In I I months he had passed these examinations. He then prepared himself for the law examinations, not through the usual cram courses of a few weeks' duration, but by diligent, thorough, individual study. He read Jus tinian in Latin and worked through the Common Law of England in "nine months of fairly hard la bour " (1957:80) . He passed these examinations, tOO, though doing so did not give him the feeling that he was qualified to practice law.
Gandhi had relatively little to say about what he gained from his formal education, perhaps because, as Erikson (1969: 144) comments, "Such a man never admits that he has learned anything essential from anybody except where he chooses to ascribe to some body else what he has already figured out for him self." In any event, he absorbed a great deal during his three years in England, from his studies, from his vegetarian friends, and from other sources in the lively intellectual climate of London. He went to hear famous preachers, returning to listen to one of them, Joseph Parker, "again and again." He attended the funeral of a famous freethinker and friend of India, Charles Bradlaugh, and there caught a glimpse of militant atheists (Pyarelal 1965:260-6 I) . He met some Theosophists and with them read the Bhagavad Gita for the first time. They introduced him to Madame Blavatsky, the famous mystic, and he read one of her books: "This book stimulated in me the desire to read books on Hinduism, and disabused me of the notion fostered by the missionaries that Hinduism was rife with superstition" (1957:68).
He acquired very little, to be sure, of any skills that would be immediately useful for the ostensible pur pose of his study in England, the practice of law. But he did acquire much that was far more important. He learned to speak the language fluently and to write it clearly. He took on those minor appurtenances of English culture that are major social clues, the nice ties of deportment and address, of friendly bearing and courtesy. He became familiar with the contempo rary currents of English thought, political as well as philosophical, relating to practical household details as well as to grand moral schemes. He saw these ideas being tried and argued; they became live issues in his awareness and not just printed arguments in boring books. Moreover, he had discovered a kind of social relationship with Englishmen that he could not have glimpsed among the English colonial administrators in India. Englishmen and even Englishwomen, he found, could be his sympathetic friends, his admiring sponsors, his companions and colleagues (cf. Oldfield 1951) .
He had made broad and full use of his opportuni ties in England. The constraint of his vow had turned out to be an avenue to intellectual adventure and 189 social enlargement. He had started on a personal adaptation that combined a thorough Indian identity with modern ideas and capabilities. Gandhi concludes the story of his three years in England by telling of his misgivings about whether he was clever and knowl· edgeable enough to earn a living in the law, "with juSt a little leaven of hope mixed with my despair" (1957:83) . But he also returned secure of himself as an Indian and, as was to become apparent, turned into an augmented Indian. H is elder brother met him at the docks with the news of his mother's death. It was a severe shock, he wrote, but "I could even check the grief and took to life as though nothing had happened" (1957:87-88). There was no carryover as with his father's death; he owed no unpaid and unpayable debt to his mother. What he felt pressed to do now was to pick up the strands of his career, to follow the career line indicat ed for a man of his profession, jati, and family. His elder brother urged that before anything else he repair the rift with the caste fellows.
The section of the jati at Rajkot was willing to readmit him, but the Bombay and Porbandar elders were adamantly against doing so unless he paid a heavy fine (Pyarelal 1965:281) . To please the Rajkot group, his brother took him to the sacred center at Nasik, where Gandhi ritually purified himself. At Rajkot his brother gave a caste dinner as a rite of reintegration. Gandhi never tried to be restored to caste by the other sections, and in that refusal he made the first of a series of imponant negative deci sions of this period. Had he fought to get the ban revoked, he would have admitted what almost all of his peers took for granted, that full jati participation was a status dearly to be cherished and vigorously to be defended if challenged. In doing nothing to re move the ban, he ref used to bind his own identity closely to that of his jati. More than a year after his return to India he wrote in a letter to a friend that the caste opposition was as great as ever. He asked, "Is it not almost better not to have anything to do with such fellows than to fawn upon them and wheedle their fame so that I might be considered one of them?" He added, "However I have to work with the times" (1958:72) .
The ban meant that his "fife's parents and other relatives could not entertain him or his wife openly; but that was a problem for her rather than for him. Her relatives were willing to meet with him secretly, but he would not consider doing anything in a c1an destine way. "The result of my scrupulous conduct," he wrote, "was that I never had occasion to be trou bled by the caste ... " (1957:91) . He never allowed himself to be close to or dependent on them either, a very uncommon posture and a considerable break with cultural expectations.
His brother's rosy hopes that he would quickly set up a lucrative professional practice came to very little. After a stay with the family in Rajkot, he moved to Bombay by himself to study Indian law, to gain experience by attending the High Court, and to get what briefs he could attract. He learned very little Indian law on his own; he did not know enough about it to benefit much from daily attendance at the High Coun; and the one small case he obtained resulted in humiliating failure. Erikson (1969: 160-61) notes that "a stubborn inner voice obviously did everything to sabotage any success as a lawyer either in Rajkot or in Bombay." Again, Gandhi was choosing what he would not do. Certainly he would not pay the com missions and tip the LOuts, as was the common law· yers' custom, because he thought it dishonorable to do so. He was dead against engaging in khutput (machination and intrigue) as a successful lawyer was supposed to (d. Gandhi 1958:71) .
His aversion to the expected procedures was deep ened by a distasteful encounter. His brother had incurred the displeasure of the English political agent in Rajkot because of suspected complicity in an affair of some missing state jewels. It so happened that Gandhi had met this officer in England, and his brother urged him to go to the political agent to plead his case. Gandhi reluctantly did so, was received coldly, continued to argue after the political agent told him to leave, and was finally pushed out by the agent's servant. He thought of suing the agent, but when he sought advice from the leading Indian law yer of Bombay he was told that he would accomplish nothing by pursuing the matter and that he should pocket the insult (1957:97-98) . Gandhi writes that he did pocket the insult but also profited from it. He determined never again to place himself in such a false position. That is, he would never allow family obligations and cultural expectations to press him into acts that conflicted with his own sense of public obligation and personal conduct. He concludes, "This shock changed the course of my life " (1957:99) . Other passages in the autobiography also proclaim life changes; most of them, like this one, confirm an ongoing direction, indicating general turnings rather than sudden swervings. In these months, Gandhi was turning away from the course that was culturally indicated and from conduct that was socially con venient (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967:242-55) .
He found one person during this time from whom he could learn, but in the end he could not take up the traditional role which that relationship implied. In Bombay he met a remarkable man, Raychand, who was not much older than he was but who impressed Gandhi greatly by his brilliant intellect, his modest demeanor, and his profound religiosity. Raychand made his living as a jewel merchant, but immediately after business hours he would turn to religious dis course and thought. He was a poet, had a phe- Pyarelal 1965:273-81) . Through his dis cussions with Raychand, Gandhi clarified and strengthened his ideas ~bout religion. Gandhi recal led, "Though I was then groping, and could not be said to have any serious interest in religious discus sion, still I found his talk of absorbing interest" (1957:89) .
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
A man who felt so drawn to such a tcacher usually lOok him as his guru, his spiritual men LOr, guide, and preceptor. Gandhi wrote that he believed in the Such familial reforms were not, in Gandhi's eyes, trivial or makeshift gestures. In later years he took continuing interest in the affairs of all his family, both immediate and extended. He frequently gave advice when asked in the family affairs of others, even of strangers who poured out their problems to him in letters. As for his immediate family, he made no distinction betwcen his public cthic and his private cthic. At one time during this pcriod Gandhi sent KaslUrbai back to her father's house; "for he could not come to tcrms with her," Erikson comments, "until she would accept the fact that his family, to remain his family, would have to become pan of a reform community reformed by him" (1969: 159; also see Rudolph and Rudolph 1967: 159, 245) .
He held fast LO his self-image as a reformer, but it was, in all, a bleak time. A year later, after this interval was behind him, he wrote out somc advice for begin ning barristcrs like himself. Writing as "one who has undergone the bitter experience" (Pyarelal 1965:285) , he emphasized [hat a reserve of money was essential to tide them over until they could get their practice well started. Yet money was not the root cause of the problems he had had with the caste elders, or of his aversion to the usual lawyers' manip ulations, or his need to place public ethic above familial obligation. These were-all part of a rejection of the cultural course laid out for him. In a kind of negative adaptation, he was trying to preserve the roles, the relations, the self-image he had begun to fashion in England and to shift away from some of The story of Gandhi's life from the South African years on becomes pan of the sLOry of a great political and religious enterprise. These periods arc amply documented and have been described in a number of excellent studies. This summary outline of them nec essarily passes over very much of consequence in detail and interprctation.
Within a few hours of his arrival at Durban Gandhi sensed the plight of the Indians in South Africa; within a few days he had taken a stand on a matter of symbolic civil rights, his right to wear a turban in court; and within two weeks he felt himself faced \vith a critical decision. On his first trip away from Durban, to Pretoria, he was thrown off the train at night because he insisted on occupying a first-class com partment, as the ticket he had bought entitled him to do, cvcn though a European passenger was in that compartment. Through the cold dark hours of that night at the lonely Maritzburg station, he debated his course. "Should I fight for my rights or go back to India, or should I go on to Pretoria without minding the insults, and return to India after finishing the case?" He decided to take the next train to Pretoria and to fight, not only for his rights, but also to root out "the deep disease of colour prejudice" (1957: 112) .
Years later, when a visiting American religious teacher asked Gandhi what had been the most crea tive experience of his life, he recalled that winter night when he sat and shivered in the waiting room. That, he said, was the one experiencc that had changed the course of his life: "My active non violence began from that date" (Pyarelal 1965:298; Erikson 1969:47, 166--67) _ If there were any sharp turning points in Gandhi's life, this was certainly one, but in the longer perspective we can see that the night in the Maritzburg station symbolized the kind of dilemma Gandhi frequently encountered and that his decision was of a kind he had made earlier and would go on to make time and again.
His first weeks in South Africa showed him how much he could accomplish that was fully in keeping with his inclinations and capacities. He found himself to be the entire Indian professional middle class (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967:182) . He was the only aniculate spokesman for many thousands of Indians of all creeds and classes. From them he won a strong and immediate response to his first effons at raising their status. The mere fact that he tried to get legal aid for an indentured laborer who had been beaten by his European master became widely known and, as Gandhi wrote, "gave the indentured laborers a joyful surprise and inspired them with hope" (1957:111).
I n a very shon time he became the principalleadcr of all his fellow countrymen in South Africa. In the three years 1893-96, he worked out the foundations of his new definition of courage, of his new technique of satyagraha ("truth-force" in nonviolent strug gle), of his new roles, personal and political. In that turning period he turned himself into a modem lead er, He became a man of purposeful action, of egal itarian reform, of mass politics. In some ways, par ticularly in his bodily ethic and his transcendental outlook, he was and remained, as he pUl it, as ancient as the hills. But in his political action he became as modern as any great political leader of the 20th CCOLUfY. He nOl only used but created mass media; he not only taught radical ideas, but developed techni ques by which to get them realized (cf. Rudolph and Rudolph 1967:216-17) .
During this turning period he added to the Slrengths he had developed in Kathiawad as a son of his society and in London as a creative combiner of two cultures. He chose a new role and defined its dimensions. He was rewarded by great success, in popular response and in monetary earnings. He took the personal hardships he endured as necessary in gredients of his gains for his people. Yet great as was his popular acclaim among Indians of South Africa, the social consequences of his efforts there were lim ited. The South African scene was still a narrow stage for social action, the Indians there were not a main pan of South African society, and powerful social forces eventually reduced the gains made by Gandhi's movement.
NATIO AL POLITICS, WORLD IMPORTANCE
The gains of the tu rning period of 1917-19 were never to be so eroded. These were the years after Gandhi had left South Africa for good and had spent three comparatively quiet years establishing himself and his ideas in the Indian milieu. Then, in three campaigns, Indian politics were brought to a nevI level of activity and Gandhi entered a new stage of his life. He took the center of the national scene. He became the acknowledged leader of a vast political movement. He began to be a world figure.
The new role he assumed is indicated in the title Mahatma (Great Soul). popularly bestowed on him and permitted by him though never prized. ("Often the title has deeply pained me," he wrote, "and there is not a moment that I can recall when it may be said to have tickled me " [1957:xii) .) Gandhi was seen by many as a saint who lived 'a moral life worthy of emulation and at the same time a political activist who was conducting an effective struggle. There have been few other saint-politicians in world history, and Gandhi had to create the dimensions and conditions of that role. From this time to the end of his life, he was powerfully engaged in the political destiny of his countrymen. His teachings began to reach far beyond India and impressed some thinkers with their rele vance for the development of the whole of mankind. AfLer these turning experiences. he was no longer merely one among a number of Indian political lead ers. He became the central leader, and his notions came to be taken seriously by millions, though few adopted them in their entirety.
In the spring of 1917 Gandhi led a satyagraha campaign to secure the rights of workers in the indigo plantations at Champaran in Bihar. In February 1918 he led a mill workers' strike at Ahmedabad and in the next month a campaign for tax relief for cultivators in Kheda. These were campaigns on local issues, but they drew national interest and awakened nationalist aspirations. Then in the spring of 1918 he led his first all-India satyagraha campaign, against the Rowlatt Bills, a nationwide issue.
If anyone of these events was a key experience for Gandhi, it probably was the Ahmedabad strike. Erik son takes it to be such and makes it the focus of his book on Gandhi. It was there that Gandhi established the pattern of his later satyagraha campaigns. With the development of satyagraha, as Erikson (1969: 191) PUtS it, Gandhi confronted the world with the strong suggestion "that a new political instrument, endowed with a new kind of religious fervor, may yet provide man with a choice."
The great social consequences, notably national independence, that Gandhi helped to bring about in the years following 1919 were accompanied by other social consequences, notably the violence that came along with the partition. These events then led Gandhi into the final turning period of his life, be tween 1946 and his death in January 1948. An activist to the end, Gandhi was still determined to take on a new role in the political order he had helped to create. Nirmal Kumar Bose reminded Gandhi in a letter that in the early morning of December 12, 1946 "you had been telling Manu how your old life had ended and a new chapter had begun. You were going to conduct a new experiment in non-violence of the brave ..." (Bose 1953:184) . A few days before that, Gandhi had told an interviewer that he had come to Bengal to try to halt the riots: "My own doctrine was failing. I do not want to die a failure, but as a successful man" (Bose 1953:252) . A few weeks later he stated again, "I do not want to dIe a discredited or defeated man," and went on to say that he was trying to reach the state of mind and personality described in the Gila but was still far from it (Bose 1953:159).
To be sure, Gandhi did not want to abandon the principles that he had developed for himself and had taught to others. But he wanted to strengthen and adapt them and to adapt his life course into the next stage of his active involvement. That stage was never to come, but we can discern the direction he was taking. His new role would extend the principles of satyagraha-for example, respecting one's opponents and letting them know that they are worthy of re spect-across national boundaries. He hoped that his new conduct would somehow be more effective than CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY he had previously been in his relations with Muslims. His new course of action would build new political and social institutions.
The nature of the man and the quality of his career are well reflected in his last will and testament, dated the day before the fatal bullets struck him. It begins with the statement that the Indian alional Congress, the institution he did most to develop, "has outlived its usc." It goes on to sketch a plan for a new political and social organization and to stipulate the require ments for active membership in it. Then follows a list of cxisting agencies to be affiliatcd with the proposed one and a final sentence on how to finance this new organization. The stage that Gandhi was then prepar ing to enter was nOt that of a retired recluse but that of an activist whose purposc would bc [ 
III
LEVELS OF U:--JDERSTANDING
The procedural guidelines seem useful in sorting out the copious information on this life history. By sketching in the cultural dimension, we describe a people's expectations for a life course, their plan for lives. A cultural life plan, however, is not a single, clearly demarcated sequence of expected develop ment like the four ideal stages of Hindu scripture. The actual expectations are more like a broad design of which some sections are only dimly indicated while others are sharply drawn. An obsel"ver may find clear regularities where the participants can give only blurry anticipations. Conversely, some of the partici pants' firm forecasts may turn out on examination to be quite differently enacted. Alternate paths are recognized at certain junctures and for different kinds of participants. Despite such vagueness and vagaries, a people does guide itself by its cultural design for a life course. In using it, people take account of biological growth as they interpret the somatic unfolding; in it they assume the available technological and ecological resources; they assign diffcrent life progressions according to the strUCLUre of their society_ \"'hat I have included in thc social dimension has mainly to do with those of a person's relations, choices, and decisions that are not culturally stipulat ed, yet are characteristic of behavior in his society. Gandhi's experiences wiih his classmates or, say, the consequences of his birth order in his family fall vvithin this category. Whether it is better for purposes of anaJysis to separate the cultural and social dimen· sions or [ At no stage is a person merely an inert recipient of the cultural and social stamp, but in childhood he has less scope for choice, less capacity for social maneu· ver. We have seen that Gandhi underwent a major turning between the ages of 13 and 17, growing from the child to the young man. In pan this turning was prescribed; he was suddenly plunged into the rigidly defined role of husband. But even in that stipulated role there was much that remained to be worked out between husband and wife. And in the self-chosen role of friend, Gandhi's experiences seem to have been more characteristic than he realized. Indeed, through most of his youthful turning, Gandhi made the kinds of adaptation that were indicated in his culture and society.
The idea of adaptation focuses our attention on the dual consideration of what the individual changes in his life and what he maintains through each turning. In England, Gandhi kept to his vow and so to the core of his indigenous values. To them he added new skills and knowledge and an inclination toward certain modern values. Upon his return to India, he made a negative adaptation, deciding what he would not be. Then in South Africa he carried on with the kind of adaptation he had begun in England. He quickly established his position as a man of religion and politics as well as a practicing lawyer and held that position for two decades. When he returned to India and rose on the national scene there, his mode of personal adaptation became widely known among his countrymen. But though his example had great in Auence in politics, few could take on his demanding model of religious life.
This trial run of the procedural suggestions sug gests the wider relevance of life history studies. In commenting on Gandhi's life, I have touched on several levels of analysis and have opened some interesting leads for further exploration. Perhaps the fresh angle of approach provided by almost any coherent and cogent study of life history gives rise to such leads more than does any special potency of these particular suggcstions. From this examination of one extraordinary life we have been led to consider broad ques,ions of Indian cul,ure and society, of primordial human relations and common human experiences, and of some of 'he postula,es of life history study itself.
Thus enquiry into the life plan, in its several versions, that Gandhi's family followed in his up bringing yields understandings of the local society and of certain features of Indian society in general. The ideal life design of Hindu scripture was too remote to be followed closely, even by Gandhi, who was apt [0 take religious precepts more literally than did most of his contemporaries. Yet certain of the precepts embedded in this life progression, such as the high value of asceticism, did register strongly with him. Morc compelling in his early course was the progression expected by his jati, of which the rites of passage were prime symbols and imponant sub· stance. This traditional life plan, like those of Olher jalis. provided relatively few alternatives and choice points for the individual. It was intended to produce religiously devout tradesmen living in a stable caste society in an agrarian civilization. One way of keeping a society stable is to keep the life plan for its recruits stable and effective. Modh Vania children were ex pected, in Gandhi's childhood, to do and to be JUSt what their elders had done and had been.
Yet even in traditional Kathiawad society, there was the compctition for higher status that is characteristic of Indian society, and new conditions for achieving status had been introduced with British rule. Hence Gandhi's family made some modifications in 'he ja,i's life design, selling him onto a variant of it whereby he would remain a devout Modh Vania while becoming a vVestern-educated professional man. In the event, as we have seen, Gandhi did not follow either the traditional design or this modified, updated version. But in the modification we can sense how people in India managed to absorb and adapt to alien elements. Gandhi's self-design was a created personal adapta tion on a new scale that nOt only helped to bring about great political movement but also, in its way, maintained a traditional kind of adaptation to bring about change within continuity.
In the sphere of personal development, we have noted Mohandas's reactions in some of the primordi al human relations and his passage through some of the generic human experienccs. Sons in many cul tures encounter the problems of personal identity, generation succession, and life values in the figure of the father, encounters that typically become most sharply etched in the adolescent passage from boy hood to manhood (cf. Erikson 1970:732-34). In the culture of Gandhi's boyhood, the tribulations of the adolescent turning were mingled into an early transi tion from boy to husband. Relations between father and son were placed on a special plane by magnifying the revercnce expected of the son for the father and the authority of father over son. Gandhi, as we have seen, did not consciously question the precepts about father-son relations and testified that he incorporated their meanings deep within his being. His adolesccnt testing of other precepts, including some of the deep-seatcd taboos concerning touch and ingestion, resulted in renewed allegiance '0 mos' of them. Yet during this period he also began to cast himself in the role of reformer, one who could help change cenain of his countrymen's ways and so help bring about a better life for them. As he later developed his vision of the better life, he urged the abandonment of certain of the cultural precepts, notably the notion of untouchability.
Gandhi seen as a special and rare kind of person, as a great religious innovator, involves another level of analysis. Erikson (1969: 183) notes that such men have the ability to reenact a characteristic personal dif ficulty, "a curse," in such a way "that its communal experience becomes a liberating event for each mem ber of an awe-stricken audience," About this mode of analysis, Erikson (J 968a:718) wryly comments, "The psychoanalyst, it seems, makes a family affair out of any historical evenc" Yet every figure in a critical event is in some pan a product of his family experi ence, and so family affairs are not irrelevant to an understanding in depth of socially momentous af fairs. 50 the full life history of a great man like Gandhi necessarily takes into account the small circle from which he sprang. Conversely, the life study of an ordinary man, such as Mintz's (1960) study of the Puerto Rican worker Taso or my (1960) sketch of the Indian villager 5ulli, can rela'e such a man to the larger society and great civilization in which he par ticipates.
The shape of a personality, great or ordinary, is defined by the priorities and importance that a per son gives to attitudes, emotions, experiences, and thoughts that are known to most people in his culture but differently weighed among them. And the shape of a culture can be defined in the same way, by the priorities assigned to humanity's common experi ences by those who carryon that way of life (cf. Freud 1963: 138; Kluckhohn 1945: 134-35) .
Each person is both a bound actor and a free agent. In the study of life history we can consider the degree to which he is either and the importance of both. This approach enables us to see that an individual has some opponunity for self-direction within the un written scenario of his culture and the open-ended drama of his society. It is a means of understanding his point of view, the choices of which he is aware, the indeterminacy that he perceives.
Taking this dual view means combining methods that are sometimes defined as contrasting rather than compatible, such as the idiographic and the nomo thetic, the posture of the humanis' and that of the social scientist (cf. Weil 1970). Moreover, the life hiswry approach is dual in another sense; in using it we are obliged to keep track of the changes in the subject's view and in his objective circumstances as he grows from stage to stage, and we are also kept alert to those constant themes of behavior that pervade and bind together the whole of a life.
Such constant themes are postulated by BUhler's (1968a; I 968b: 1-1 0) idea of intentionality as the integrating principle in a life course. Her emphasis that each life has a structure, that it can be under stood as a system with consistent properties and potentialities, and that personal creativity is a central CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY element, is fundamental to life history studies. One clement of such constancy is the process identified by Freud as transference and defined by Erikson as "a universal tendency to experience another person (unconsciously of course) as comparable to an im portant figure of the preadult past " (1970:737) .
The view of a life as a system of aclion entails the premise that an individual tries to maintain a certain order in his behavior, whether as an individual or as a member of a group, and that he maintains certain priorities of action. Clausen (1971 :79) has discussed the ways in which a person establishes his role priori ties and the characteristic ways by which he resolves role conflicts. An integral element in my o\\'n use of the concept of system is the redressive action that is put into play when an expected order of behavior is disturbed (Mandelbaum 1970:4-5, 660-63; see also Leighton and Leighton 1949:33 and Leighton 1959) .
One of the benefits of using the life history ap proach is that in doing so we are better able to bring out the coping, creative aspects of a person's behav ior. This approach helps to rectify what has been called the "oversocialized" image of man that com monly is found in the social sciences (d. Wrong 1961). It does not deny the observer's view of the analyzed Ego, but rather supplements it with the crucial perspective of the actor's "I."
The image of man held by an observer necessarily influences what he makes of the life of the particular man he is studying. That image is moulded partly by his culture and, if he is a scholar or scientist, more directly by the state of his academic discipline. Gar raty (1957:160), in discussing this aspect of the writ ing of biography, specifically mentions Gandhi and asks, dubiously, whether a Western European Chris tian could produce a satisfactory biography of the Hindu, Gandhi. But while there are, to be sure, special advantages in having an empathetic, existen tial understanding of the person being studied, there are also advantages in having a less adhesive perspec tive. Best of all is to have contributions of both kinds about a person's life and about his culture (cf. Srinivas 1966:147-63).
On Gandhi's life we do have books of boih kinds, and from them we can begin to put together a comprehensible life history that will show his per sonal qualities-spritely humor and firm determina tion among them-as well as his political impact and social relevance. Each author gives his own Gandhi, his own version of the recorded or remembered testimony. All have been influenced by Gandhi's own version of Gandhi, since he was the selector and Mandtlbaum: THE STUDY OF LIFE HISTORY; GANDHI source of much that is known about him. Every succeeding account has necessarily had to come to terms with this one. Because Gandhi was so strong a figure, his life and work are linked to the whole view of recent Indian history and of India as a nation.
Two views of Gandhi that are current among educated people in India are noted by Dasgupta (1969) . One view is that Gandhi was primarily a politician, solely concerned with the ousting of the colonial regime and with political independence. The other view is that he was essentially a saint and that as a man of God he was neither wholly of this earth nor of very much eanhly relevance. Dasgupta discusses both these views and advocates another-that Gandhi's main role was that of a fighter for the raising of the oppressed. As a champion of the poor of this world "he had sought to 'seize' no power but to create a new form of it for an altogether new type of decision-maker."
This interpretation is now of special interest, not only because problems of unalleviated poverty and unmanageable power are central issues in the world, but also because the view of Gandhi as one who was creative in the face of faceless custom and was effec tive against bureaucratic power is an image that many find cogent today.
Such interpretations are part of the contemporary experiments with truth. If we can study the lives of men and women in the perspectives here suggested, if we can view them as persons more than as objects, as adapting social beings as well as actors repeating cultural roles, we may arrive at a wider knowledge not only of the life and times of great men like Gandhiji but also of our own lives and times.
Abstract
The study of lives as wholes has not yet been well developed in the social sciences, though a good many anthropologists, psychologists, political scientists, and sociologists have written about its imponance. These authors agree that a main shortcoming in such study is the lack of suitable concepts to make up a coherent frame of reference. Three procedural suggestions, the ideas of adaptation, dimension, and turning, may be useful for the beginnings of such a frame. These suggestions are intended as guidelines for the collec tion and analysis of data. Their applicability is illus trated in the life history of Gandhi, a man whose life is worth studying for a number of reasons. Mandelbaum commendably seeks to synthesize some of the best thoughts of two approaches, the life passage approach and the life history ap proach, into a new theoretical and research direction. He has rightly rec ognized the lack of a general concep tual scheme for the convergence of the two approaches. Perhaps this is be cause there is still more to be done in weaving the threads of the two approaches into a recognizable pat~ tern. It is with this in mind that I raise the following issues.
References Cited
1. Every life history study entails selection of the information which serves as input into the analysis. What are selected for evaluation are "life passage events" and the preceding ac tivities of the person whose life is being studied. It is this purposeful selection which accounts for the distinctiveness among life history studies. Mandel baum seeks to minimize this distinc tiveness by creating a general frame work of dimensions as a tool of analysis. In the curriculum vitae one submits from time to time in one's passage through the academe, the positions one includes or excludes depend upon the aspect of the self one wishes to present to the institution or body of evalu.ators. It is, in part, this purposeful selection which makes one curriculum vitae different from another in es sence, but in the final analysis it is often the perceptual scheme of the evalua tors which decides. The nexuses be tween the dimensions have yet to be identified, described, and illustrated.
The section titled "Turnings" pro vides Mandelbaum an opportunity to map out the network of interrelations among dimensions. This mapping, however, does not take place, even though he recognizes its importance in saying that "the turning thus com bines elements of three dimensions." It should have been shown how, for example, the cultural dimension inter relates with the psychological, the bio logical with the psychological and/or the cultural, etc. What trait in one dimension interacts with what other in a second or third dimension when a person makes a transition in his life? How does one describe each pattern of interrelated traits?
In Lee's (1959) decisions, to speak and act for himself? And: at what point do we begin to allow him to do so? For example, obviously when the mother first takes her infant to the pediatrician, she has to speak for him. Exactly when does she begin to remain silent, waiting for him to understand and answer the doctor's questions and to express his own likes and opinions and conclu sions?" The turnings in the life of the child and of the mother occur within the framework of dependence to au lOnomy. Both certainly involve physi~ ological and cultural dimensions. Both entail changing of roles, the opera tionalization of expectations, and an "awareness context" (Glaser and Strauss 1967) . How many such rela tions among dimensions occur in a life history? Most likely, an unwieldy number.
Dependence-autonomy and "awareness context" are some core cate gories for generating substantive and formal propositions. Mead and Macgregor (1951) , in their study of physical growth and culture among the Balinese, make the point clearer: each child studied maintained his individuality through the stages of "the Balinese version of the develop mental progression from sitting with support to walking." Could the ap proach being developed by Mandel baum be regarded as a framework for studying such versions of develop mental progressions?
2. According to Mandelbaum, ad aptation is "a built-in process"; but it is not clear if it is a process whereby the human organism copes with new conditions only or a process whereby continuity of self~image or survival is maintained. Could it be conceptualized as both? Whatever it is, the task re mains of indicating the intercorrelated dimensions of adaptationaI processes.
3. Does the section on Gandhi rep resent a life history, or only some sort of curriculum vitae (i.e., selected per formances and achievements present ed to an evaluator)? My position is that it is the latter and that the events selected indicate Mandelbaum's own concerns.
4. What does the atypical personal ity tell us about his culture and society?
If we regard geographic area of resi dence as an intervening variable, how do we explain or predict the interrela tions between it and the turnings and adaptations-positive and negative in a person's life? and does being a member of a particular age~group or sex make a difference in interpreting the impact of change of area of resi dence? If every society designs a life plan for its members and then builds Mandelbaum: TH£ STUDY OF un: HISTORY: GANDHI into this design a limited degree of freedom for the individual to self-de sign his life (and in turn help society bring about change in continuity), is it reasonable to generalize from the life of Gandhi that the choice an indi~ vidual makes at a given time or place plays a more important part in the life of the extraordinary person than it does in that of an ordinary person? Might one even say that the extraor dinary person in any society is one who more than most people maximizes his freedom of choice? This observation is intended to suggest that the conver gence of the two approaches provides a very promising basis for generating grounded theories (Glaser and Strauss 1967) from life histories and life events.
5. In analysing Gandhi's "re-enact ment of personal difficulty," Mandel baum seems to me to be dealing with the phenomenon that Cumming and Cumming (1962) have iden,tified as "ego growth through crisis resolution." His discussion of Gandhi's innovating religious behaviour seems to need fur ther development. The Cummings refer to Caplan's (1961) definition of crisis as a situation [which] offers both danger and opportunity. They also draw our attention to his concepts of openness and vulnerability during crisis, which he regards as key variables in the theory of prevention of ego damage in children. Again, the Cum mings point to grief as a variable in crisis resolution, particularly in indi~ vidual persons who are bereaved. The religious innovation of Gandhi may be viewed, therefore, as a positive adap tive act of ego restitution and milieu reconstitution in response to his grief at the loss of his father and the "ego diffusion" (Erikson 1950) due, in part, to the guilt he felt when his father's death was announced to him. The innovative nature of this act is a result of his not having followed the tradi tional design for producing changes in himself and his community. Thus Gandhi confirms Mandelbaum's state~ ment that "each person is both a bound actor and a free agent." 6. Mandelbaum's systemic view of human action bears some resemblance to the system of programmed activities one encounters in planning (PERT). An important basic difference is that the human system of action is one of far greater freedom, a far wider range of options, and therefore a far more complicated flow-chart and a critical path of analysis less easily determined than in cybernetics. This, as he himself has suggested, may be due to the fact that our ultimate concern here is more 197 with persons than with objects. The approach detailed by Mandelbaum is of special value in the study of man in society and culture because of its emphasis on man as a creative being "in the face of faceless custom" and an effective actor "against burea ucratic power."
A few core categories of concepts em crge-de pc nde nce-au tonom y, awareness context, versions of devel opment progression, and so on-for labelling the interrelations between di mensions and traits. As the literature is combed, more may be found, or new ones come to mind, with which to build the theoretical framework of this im portam approach.
Vancouver, Canada. 13 IX 72 An interesting contrast emerges be tween the first sections of this essay, where Mandelbaum outlines the role of life histories in the social sciences, and a later section where he discusses the life of Gandhi.
In the earlier part, Mandelbaum conveys the impression, though per haps unintentionally, that the appro priate model for social science, and thus the only one to which biography should also aspire if it is to be useful to social science, is one concerned with the development of general concepts, explanations, and laws. In his review of Gandhi's life, on the other hand, Mandelbaum weaves neatly between this generalizing analytic mode and a more particularizing (or historical) method of analysis. In the case of the former approach, individual life his· tories (like ethnographies) typically provide case materials for the develop· ment of general or analytic concepts; in the case of the latter, general can· cepts may provide materials for the interpretation of concrete individual cases. Except possibly by radical positi vists, who would restrict scientific ere· ditability to the generalizing mode alone, both are usually considered to be respectable scientific orientations and, as Mandelbaum himself demon strates, can be useful in combination (c!. Aron 1964:68-69).
So despite the essay's positivistic be ginnings, Mandelbaum remains a good historical scientist (read "ethnog rapher") as well. His essay nevenhe· less reflects a dilemma many cultural amhropologists back into: how to rec· oncile their aspirations to emulate the positivist model of science with their traditi'onal grounding in the hisLOrical ethnographic mode of analysis. If one takes what Mandelbaum does rather than what he says as the guide, then the combination of the two ap proaches, rather than the transforma tion of one into the other, would ap pear to be the way to reconciliation.
by I IRMAL KUMAR BOSE
CaLcutta, India. 21 I 72 Mandelbaum has shown how the study of a life like that of Gandhi can dem onstrate the way in which a personality may develop in the culture in which it was born and the way in which innovations and departures may take place. In Gandhi's case, the culture was the subculture of the Modh Vania Vaishya trading community in Kath iawad, Gujarat. But Gandhi was in fluenced by his home-culture also; the particular family to which he belonged had deviated from the norms and expectations of the jati to an apprecia ble extent by assuming administrative work in the princely states, and his mother belonged to a rather unortho dox Vaishnava sect. Over and above all this, Gandhi was an innovator on his own account. His life took sharp turns when he left home for education in England, when he took up the legal profession in South Africa, and when he came back to India and took up the role of reformer and political lead· er.
Mandelbaum's analysis of all this is most satisfactory, but my feeling is that it leaves one aspect of Gandhi's cultural universe inadequately described. The culture of the people of Gujarat (and of the Modh Vanias) was itself under strain on account of the imposition of British rule over several Generations. The old culture was losing prestige, and new ways had arisen for the sake of gaining prestige. It was not true that integration of old and new was taking place, even in the personal life of Indians in Gujarat. Rather, there was replacement of one culture by another, resulting in discontinuity and logical disconformity between the rul ing ideas of what remained of the old and the ruling ideas of the new, which enjoyed prestige because of its associa tion with the economically and politi· cally dominant rulers. This conflict between cultures that was taking place during Gandhi's boyhood and youth has not, I believe, been adequately brought out. The universe in which Gandhi lived, made up of conflicting cultures, gave him a wide choice in building his own. Values and prestige were shifting, and Gandhi obviously reacted to this. Mandelbaum has been more concerned with showing conti nuity and change in Gandhi's life. 1 would call his attention to the ways in which the atmosphere of India in the late 19th century afforded various kinds of choices.
Mandelbaum's paper combines a care ful and comprehensive account of the data of Gandhi's life history with a valuable attempt at the organization and conceptualization of this material. As the author points out correctly, there is still a great dearth of theoreti cal concepts and models for the han dlingof life history data. Such concepts and models as have been proposed have usually been determined by the general psychological outlook of the author. Thus, there is up to this point no unanimity on the question of which concepts and models to apply. Mandelbaum has chosen "the ideas of adaptation, dimension, and turn· ing" as the beginnings of a frame. The definition of the concept of "dimen· sions" with which the author begins his study appears to be useful and satisfactory, at least until we know more about genetic determinants. The concept of "turnings" may be a good alternative to the controversial concept of "stages" or "phases," as it seems more neutral and more dynamic. My argument is with the concept of "adap· tation," with which the author covers at least two opposite modes of being or of relating to the outside world.
"Adaptation," says the author, "is a built-in process, because every person must, in the course of his life, alter some of his established patterns of behavior to cope with new conditions." However, "creativity" is also a "built-in process," and this not only may mani fest itself when change is necessary to cope with new conditions, but may be the generator of the change of condi tions because of-as far as we know at this point-internal processes in the individual. The author deals with these creative procedures in Gandhi's life as "negative adaptations" or as due to the "stimulus of South Africa." Yet he himself says that "most of [Gandhi's] role behavior was self-created" and speaks of roles as "self-chosen and self-defined" and of "his self.image as a reformer."
Creativity, which in outstanding re cent research has been shown to ap pear in personality structures funda· mentally different from that of adap tive individuals (Getzels and Jackson 1962, MacKinnon 1961) , is in my opinion misconceived if it is charac terized as "negative adaptation" or as due to outside stimuli. A reformer of Gandhi's stature is the epitome of a creative person though one who, be· cause of the strong traditions of his background, probably had more in tense conflicts about his nonconfor· mity than a person less embedded in CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY tradition. This may explain his ex ceedingly strict adherence 1O traditions wherever they did not interfere with his reform ideas, as for example in regard to vegetarianism and the dis value of sensual pleasure.
In spite of these different interpre tations, I consider Mandelbaum's study highly stimulating, scholarly, and valu able.
by FIl.ED l. GREENSTEIN Middletown, Conn., U.S.A. 1 IX 72 One hopes that Mandelbaum's valu able review of the field of life hislOry studies will help resurrect this (rela tively) neglected genre. His essay is of particular interest to political scientists, since from the standpoint of political analysis life hislOry data are relevant to both emphases noted in Mandel baum's opening passage-not only "how the person copes with society" but also "how society copes with the stream of individuals." The latter is germane because individual political actors (and hence the life hislOry ante cedents of their personal qualities) can be so politically consequential (Green stein 1969). It is fashionable in the social sciences to stress that social role requirements tend to mitigate the ef fects of the personal qualities of role incumbents on their behavior. Yet many political roles leave room for the personal qualities of the actor to affect his behavior. And even if individuals were randomly distributed in social roles it would follow that over time a role might be filled by very different individuals.
A recent example, almost too strik ing to give, is the differences in ap proach to the American Presidency of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. It would not be difficult to defend-even though it is inevitably impossible 1O demonstrate-the coun terfactual proposition that if Kennedy had lived the Vietnam conflict would not have been drastically escalated. Critical in such an argument would be a life history analysis of the two men such as appears in Barber's Tile Presidential Character: Predicting Per formance in the White Hou.se (1972) . This allusion to the American Presidency further helps to pin down why life history analysis contributes to the study of politics. Needless to say, American Presidents have extraordinary powers. The more powerful the role, the more it is the case that the life history of the incumbent is of interest, even if "role constraints" leave only modest room for the play of individual quali ties.
In the light of these reflections, it would be interesting to have an expan- This article deals with the central question of the life history of the indi vidual and its relationship 1O events of his culture. To some degree it takes us back to the 19th-century pre occupation with the exceptionally potent man (the hero) and society. Mandelbaum places the problem con vincingly into our contemporary frame of knowledge. To me the chief prob lem of individual life and cultural his tory, both as to meaning and as to methodology, is this: What are the structures (and corresponding con ceptual constructs), in a culture and in its members, which constitute an interrelated mutuality and underlie their imerrelated transformations? Mandelbaum chooses the ideas of di mension (cultural, social, and psycho social), turning, and adaptation in in dividual life history. This is a good start. In my view (Haydu 1958 (Haydu , 1961 (Haydu , 1970 (Haydu , 1972 ) the loci of this mutuality are the experiential entity patterns. These are alive only in individuals, yet can be discovered through the "arti facts" that each individual produces and the artifacts of past patterns that he is heir to. Experiential entity is that contex ture (functional individuality) which a person forms in a particular inten tion process. (An intention process is an organismic, goal-directed activity based on past outcomes.) A person's experiential entity patterns can be dis covered in his productions. These per sonal productions-the results of a particular way of seeing and seeking, the establishing of particular human relationships, a particular method of handling his ambience, an object of art-are inconceivable without the huge wealth of past productions pre served and embedded in the nonliving structures of his culture. These past productions become alive only in a living person and thereby undergo transformation even in the most stable stretch of a cultural trajectory. Each person recreates (always in a modified form) the cultural nonliving structures as experiential structures of his own, and these structures are transmitted to his cultural ambience and carried by it. Here is the scope and limitation an individual has for altering the structures of his culture. In my opin ion, this is the locus of these mutually Mandelbaum: THE STUDY OF LIFE HISTORY: GANDHI interrelated transformations, and it is amenable to experimental or at least empirical study.
There is one very strict proviso in this respect. Factors and forces can be discovered both in personal life and in society, but the shape (to use Man delbaum's expression) of experiential structures can never be truly perceived by enumerating factors or other ele ments. Factors and vectors may all be very true in a particular instance, but the shape, as configuration of a struc ture, must be discovered qua shape and not as a summation of forces or an arbitrary "profile" gained by some astute juxtaposition of factors.
Experiential entities integrate bio logical needs and instrumentalities, their modifications as they consti tute individual enculturation, ambient opportunities and adversities, and conceptual certainties. They are the smallest units (psychemes) that are yet full-blown life events. Each can be analyzed as to the factors that contrib ute to its form, and each can be shown in many structural equivalents of its particular shape (configuration). To my mind, much has been already achieved in the study of these matters, and Mandelbaum's present article is a very welcome contribution. One can only agree with Mandelbaum that in spite of ever increasing numbers of life histories, including a few recent and exceptionally good ones, there continues to be little effort towards the systematic analysis of such documents. This may be due to certain incompat ibilities between the writing of life histories and the broader goals of an thropologists. Mandelbaum notes that one of the motives for doing a life history is the uncomfortable awareness that "his people" would otherwise be reduced to "faceless norms." But such a motive, it seems to me, would hardly lead one to want to analyze and classify. As he also notes, when it comes to the study of persons, there have been two main approaches-life passage studies and life histories. But life passage stu dies have tended to concentrate on children, whereas life histories deal almost exclusively with adults. There is also the problem of combining the idiographic with the nomothetic, as well as the attempt to reconcile the "great man" view of history and culture with the more Tolstoyan, Kroeberian view of the inexorable march of events independent entirely from the influ ence of individuals, however strong or 199 famous. All the more reason, perhaps, to welcome and respect Mandelbaum's current allempt.
The notion of a "cuilural life plan" is an interesting one. Presumably it would be possible to cross-cullUrally compare such plans just as it would be possible to determine how far any individual's life depaned from the rel evant plan. The "dimensions" Mandel baum discusses-biological, cuhural, social, and psychosocial-appear to be unusual only in his allempt to apply them formally to a life hislOry. "Turn ings" and "adaptations," although in teresting in this specific case, would be difficult, I believe, 1O use elsewhere. The Jives of ordinary men probably do not involve such obvious or so many turnings and adaptations. Nor do most men's lives divide themselves so neatly into time spent in different geographic areas. Interesting questions to ask, however, might be how flexible cultur al life plans are with respect to their tolerance for turnings, and what adap tations, if any, are required to maintain continuity in one's life course. Finally, it might be desirable to add 1O dimen sions, lUrnings, and adaptations a fur ther category, "consequences." It is dear the Gandhi's "failure" to adapt to the meat-eating habits of his English hosts had consequences every bit as significant as his "failure" 1O panicipate in the system of commissions and tips that was pan of the Indian legal system of his time-yet both of these "failures" stemmed from his consistent and pre dictable beliefs about honor and dis honor. In any event, Mandelbaum's attempt and Gandhi's life history make for a fascinating combination.
by SIDNEY W. MINTZ
New Haven, Conn., U.S.A. II IX 72 Mandelbaum's essay breaks new ground. Most anthropological life his tories are based on lengthy face-to-face encounters between anthropologist and informant-that is, between soli cited autobiographer and amanuensis. Thisattempt to expose the relationship between life trajectory and sociocul tural framework is of a different order. Gandhi was a witting autobiographer, and he was a "famous man" whose understandings of himself were shaped by a recognition of his own historic role. Such differences will af fect the insights anthropologists may bring to their work, if research of this kind continues.
The anthropological life histOry has always said a great deal about the anthropologist, and not only about his subject. A wide variety of methodo logical questions is raised by the rela tionship between informant and re corder. It may be argued that friend ship between them can "diston" the final product, suggesting the some what curious conclusion that scientific "objectivity" in such work requires mutual ignorance. When the interpre tation is based on published materials, this criticism may seem less substantial. But even such an interpretation in volves the scholar in the use of his own judgment; and whether he finds his subject sympathetic or unlikable, heroic or pathetic, will surely influence his reading of character and act. Per haps one positive methodological con sequence of work of the sort Mandel baum does here will be the recognition that the face-to-face recording of life histories is no more "subjective" or "objective" than any other biographi cal-autobiographical undertaking. The interpreter must do his best to make clear what he thinks he is like, so that readers may better judge his interpre tation of the life of another. The fre quent lack of such material in life histories strikes me as remarkable perhaps even slightly suspicious.
Mandelbaum's distinction between cultural and social dimensions IS promising. It is, I think, precisely in the disjuncture between the cultural and the social that the distinctive indi vidual quality of the life history can best be revealed. But to do so, the recorder must have substantial prior knowledge of the sociocultural setting; many life histories have been written as the recorder's single major (and often first) experience of an alien cul tural and social context. Prior knowl edge may also free the recorder from what might be described as an aes thetic compulsion to "round out" the life history-to inform it with a com pleteness and perfection pleasing 1O the literary eye, but ultimately unfaith ful to the often ragged character of ethnographic truth.
While each individual is by definition unique, the anthropologist usually proceeds on the assum plion that cul ture and society provide some man made order within which the individu al functions. A life decision, then--one of Mandelbaum's "turnings"-should partake of both the unique and the regular. The question then becomes, What are the sociocultural guidelines by which individual perceptions and decisions are shaped? Thus, for in stance, toward the end of my own work with a Puerto Rican convert to a Pente costal sect 1 was moved to ask myself what my friend may have shared with other converts like himself. Were I to return 1O the unanswered questions the delineation of his uniqueness gave rise to, 1 would want to collect three, four, or a dozen such life histories, from persons with similar sociocultural characteristics (Puerto Rican, rural proletarian, male, middle-aged, and converted to Pentecostalism), 1O seek to discern any life regularities that might unite or differentiate them. The goal of such an undertaking would not be to deemphasize individual uniqueness or to eliminate the signifi cance of personality in the study of change, but rather to specify with more confidence the way individuality plays itself out against terms set by sociocul tural forces. Mandelbaum's sensitive treatment of a person produced-like all of us-by his culture, yet a remark able world figure, dramatizes the problem. His intriguing essay suggests that we have come a long way since the spate of life history studies of the 1940s.
by HERBE.RT P. PHILLIPS Berkeley, Calif., U.S.A. 31 VI" 72 Mandelbaum has provided us with an extremely useful framework for or ganizing life history materials. I find most provocative, however, his com ment "that a study of [Gandhi's] life would be anthropologically fascinating if he had done no more than sit all his days before a pile of cloth in a bazaar shop." The vast majority of life histories collected and analyzed by an thropologists are about people much more like this imagined cloth vendor than like Gandhi, who is by any mea sure one of the major personalities, if not institutions, of the 20th century. Of course, Gandhi was still a man, and from his own point of view perhaps of no greater or lesser intrinsic merit than any random Indian cloth seller. Probably most of us wish to see him as no more extraordinary, descriptive ly and analytically, and the work of Mandelbaum and the other biogra phers demonstrates that it is possible to do so.
I would suggest, however, that methodologically the life hislOry of Gandhi is essentiaHy sui generis-that as a research problem it presents a strikingly different series of intellec tual and interpersonal opportunities and hurdles than are met in most life history studies by anthropologists. The kinds of data available to Mandelbaum and the others, the types of negotia tions these scholars make with their data, the kinds of expressiveness and resistance they encounter from their "subject" are all clearly of a different order than in the life history studies of, for example, Kluckhohn (1945) , Lewis (1961), or myself (Hanks and Phillips 1961) . The differences have to do not so much with the stature of the person whose life is being stud ied or the social forces swirling around CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY him as with the simple realities of the research situation. With Kluckhohn, Lewis, and most of us, the anthro pologist's solicitation of the life history is usually the only reason for its exis tence, and his raw data comprise all the known information on the person being described. If Gandhi had in fact been a bazaar vendor, precisely these kinds of realities would have obtained. Under such circumstances, the critical methodological issues relate primarily to the events of the interviewing ses sions: the interactive style of the parti cipants; the informational and emo tional exchanges they make; the moti vations they bring to the situation and the satisfactions and frustrations they derive from it; and the distortions, described most brilliantly by Devereux (1967) , that most persons, but espe· cially those from different cultures, bring to their encounters with others.
While these considerations attend all forms of ethnographic inquiry, they probably loom largest in the life history situation, if only because their disposi tion literally determines the kind and quality of data obtained. There are more subtle matters in volved here. For all of his openness and self-reflection, Gandhi must have had some experiences about which he felt sufficiently anxious (or guilty or ashamed) to resist discussing them with others. The importance of this is not the obvious fact that Gandhi, like all human beings, had things that he wished to repress, but rather the likeli-
hood that some of these repressions had a significant bearing on those dimensions of his character that domi nated his public life, and which made him into the person the world "knows." What is involved here is suggested by Erikson's effort, cited by Mandelbaum, to link Gandhi's spiritual innova tiveness to that "dreadful night" when he had relt "double shame." When reading
Erikson's interpretation, however, one wonders whether there were other "dreadful nights" and other such experiences that Gandhi declined to relate in his autobiography or tell friends but that nevertheless were more influential to the formation of his public character. Could a sensitive or talented investigator (or even a bumptious or manipulative one) in constant contact with Gandhi have broken through such resistance? And would the results have been worth it-to Gandhi himself, to students of life history, or to intellectual history?
These questions represent precisely those kinds of questions that a scholar involved in the interpersonal dynamics of a life history study must constantly ask himself. The answers determine when and how the investigator probes or holds back; whether he sees the person he is encountering as a "friend," a representative of some ab stract social category, or the means of fulfilling his own needs (professional or personal); whether he is willing to modify, or insists upon maintaining, his own patterns of interaction-and whether this is done in the service of the research or of the human relation· ship upon which the research is based. (The "informant," meanwhile, is mak ing his own decisions, based upon similar questions.) Obviously, there are no absolute answers to any of these queries. The answers that are made probably depend ultimately upon the characters of the people who become anthropologists and collect life histor Ies.
A few other considerations should be noted. Mandelbaum says little about the amount of time and effon that must be given to obtaining adequate life history information. As a re searcher who has gathered life histor ies from both Thai villagers and Thai intellectuals, I would underscore the temporally demanding nature of the life history enterprise. Although it is probably the most enjoyable of all ethnographic tasks, it is also the most time-consuming. I would estimate that to gather the kind of descriptive and expressive detail suggested by Man· delbaum's framework would typically require a minimum of 30-50 hours The critical question is whether such an expenditure of time and energy is warranted. My own view is that the life history is still the most cognitively rich and humanly understandable way of getting at an inner view of culture. Folklore materials might be more pithy, and religious behavior or belief more dramatic. But none can equal the life history in demonstrating what the native himself considers to be im portant in his own experience and how he thinks and feels about that experi ence. This is not to deny that natives can and do distort, avoid, or idealize in their life history repons-to them selves as well as to anthropologists. But such contrivance occurs in almost every mode of human expression; indeed, folklore and ritual are probably the most frequent forms for expressing such contrivance in an institu tionalized, culturally acceptable man ner. To the extent that the life history is more reflective and conscious than these other forms, it is probably also more controlled and artificial. Its strength lies in the fact that it is the native who is doing the reflecting and who decides among all those things that have happened to him what are to him the more or less significant, unusual or commonplace, exciting or dull. Mandelbaum has provided us with a comprehensive and highly us able scheme for making sense out of these reflections. Mandelbaum is inclined to see Gand hi's early biography and personality formation as wholly conventional for his culture. If the young man-and the older one-has a strong concern for purity and pollution, so does ev erybody else of his class, caste, religion, and region in Cujarat; if sex seems to him an animalistic drive, to be re jected with guilt and disgust, and celi bacy the only path for a moral man, that is attributable to the norms of those like him; if he tries to dominate 201 his wife, that too is culturally predict able.
Implicitly Mandelbaum is mounting a counter-argumenlLO those accounts of Gandhi's early life (Ru dolph and Rudolph 1967, Erikson 1969) which stress the idiosyncratic, with respect either to cultural themes embraced or the ways in which the cultural themes are played.
When Gandhi as a postadolescent embarks on a "rejection of the cultural course laid out for him," the question arises, Why should any youngman who had most compliantly responded to the conventional demands of his culture suddenly embark on such a rejection of them? Mandelbaum's explanation hinges on the concept of "turnings" and the idea of adaptation. In his view, Gandhi, having gone to England I and exposed himself to different sets of cultural norms, thereafter "tried to preserve the roles, the relations, the self-image he had begun to fashion in England and to shift away from some of the basic patterns of social life in Kathiawad and Bombay." This expla nation of change again invokes cultural patterns. It says that he who complied conventionally at point a, in the Modh Banya Vaishnava culLUral selling, complied conventionally at point b, in the England of the 1890s, and began to shape out of these dual demands some sort of synthesis which would, as it were, allow him to comply with both.
This account raises the question how stich compliant responses could have produced a personality which was felt by all observers to be extraordinarily creative and original, even unique. Further, it would appear to align Man delbaum with that view which finds personality to be primarily the pro duct, where the writer is an anthro pologist, of cultural rules and values or, where he is a social psychologist or sociologist, of roles. This view deemphasizes the man behind the cul tural or role mask, the player of the cultural and social game. And yet this is by no means what Mandelbaum intends: "Each person is both a bound actor and a free agent. In the study of life history we can consider the degree to which he is either and the lIn his admirable review of lhe Gandhi (and life history) lilerature, Mandelbaum may have overlooked Devanesen's (1969) The A'laking of the Mahatma, which focusses on his early life and gives particular alten lion [0 his experiences in England. The lain dimension of his Kalhiawad cullural background is perhaps overemphasized in Hay's (1972) imeresting article on that sub ject. More recent books of imerpretation that may have appeared lao late for Man delbaum to include are those by Ray (1971) , Kumar (1971) , Powers (1971) , Hutchins (1971), and Brown (1972) . importance of both." Mandelbaum emphatically dissents from the overso cialized man much of social science has constructed, but the account he renders of Gandhi does not take quite seriously what Mandelbaum the meth odologist says.
The account fails to take Gandhi seriously as a manipulator and moulder, not just a receiver and ad herent, of cultural norms and rules. While recognizing a measure of choice, Mandelbaum does not give sufficient weight to the exercise of purposive choice in the framework of culturally and historically conditioned options. Personalities not only adopt culture and roles; sometimes they create them. Gandhi did both. Mandelbaum sees the flow of causation as mainly one-way, from culture and role (society) to per sonality; personality, at best, is able to "turn" or "adapt." In Gandhi's case, the flow was mainly the other way; he treated culture and role as resources to be employed and reshaped. For a few, like Gandhi, culture and role are redefined through leadership, exam ple, and ideological innovation.
The account also fails to credit the importance for the formation of the Mahatma of historical accidents and conjunctions, for which neither cul ture, society, nor personality can ac count. This failing, as Mandelbaum himself suggests, is probably general to all the social sciences, inimical as they are to the exogenous domain of "chance," This domain resists the im position of "universal" regularities based on the simplifying assumptions of models, the abstract and selective variables they organize, and the syn· thetic or manufactured data that feed them. And the account does not suffi ciently recognize autonomous realms of meaning and action, realms that can transcend culture, society, and psyche and in so doing explain the why and the how of personality and history.
In reformulating Mandelbaum's ex planation, we do not assume, as he does, that compliance with cultural norms is to be expected. Full com· pliance-meaning behavioral, psy chological, and normative agree ment-with cultural prescriptions is as rare as it is hard to define. Such a proposition makes more sense, per haps, to a political scientist, whose "field" is complex societies with nu· merous and often conflicting options, than it does to an anthropologist, whose "field," despite recent changes, tends to be less-complex societies in which options are relatively few and authoritative allocations of values less common. Mandelbaum certainly sees Gandhi's society as belonging to the latter variety: "This traditional life plan . . . provided relatively few alterna· tives and choice points for the individ· ual. .. Modh Vania children were expected, in Gandhi's childhood, to do and to be just what their elders had done and had been." Cultural norms are as much an op portunityas a constraint, and "compli ance" can take so many forms that the word may lose its meaning in some contexts. Compliance can, for exam ple, be of the "work to rule" sort, where a perverse overcompliance becomes an act of violation, overriding the adher ence "normally" required. There is a good bit of "work to rule" overcom pliance in Gandhi's relation to most of the cultural norms he encountered. As Erikson suggests, those reformers who "mean" it, who insist on the literal or inner meaning of norms, are any thing but compliant. There is too the more frequent rhetorical or overt compliance, the Good Soldier Schweik mode of "compliance." Cultures can also be mocked or profaned; orienta tions like "work to rule" are often the source for stylistic or ideological counter-cultures. "Playing" the cul ture, as a harp with diverse strings, is, we assume, as frequent a relation to culture as being molded and pro grammed by it; the spectrum from compliance to noncompliance to counter-cultural innovation suggests the myriad possible relations of the individual to culture.
These views of compliance have cer tain implications for Mandelbaum's in terpretation of young Gandhi. Since celibacy and asceticism were so signifi cant in Gandhi's private and public life, how they were created in him remains a central problem. For Mandelbaum, these commitments flow almost direct ly from his culture:
A young couple of lhe Modh Vanias, as in the higher jatis generally, began their marital relations .
within a household where there was a strong denigration of the couple's sexual interest in each other. Gandhi's first years of marriage followed this pattern, and he emerged from them Wilh characteristic altitudes aboul sexual relations.
. He became unshakably con vinced that Jove and lust go ill together, that love begins where lust ends.
. This facet of Gandhi's belief may puzzle some today; but in the 1880s, in a Modh Vania household in a Kalhiawad town, there were no recognized alternatives to (he assump lions about sex and marriage (hal Gandhi accepted.
This interpretation does not recognize that taking the culture that seriously may itself have been idiosyncratic. We do not have enough life history ma terial, particularly in the realm of sex· ual relations, to understand the conse quences for sexual drives and sexual CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 202 relations of the systematic denigration of sexual interest and its dissociation from love. They may be as negative as Mandelbaum implies. Some sparse medical evidence points in that direc tion. Carstairs (1957) reports frequent complaints of spermatorrhoea and impotence among upper-caste men in Rajasthan who live under such norma tive constraints. Drysdale (1852), an extraordinarily perceptive and "liber al" medical writer of Victorian Eng land, reports exactly the same com plaints among his British middle-class patients, subject to similar constraints. Yet the opposite possibility is certainly viable. De Rougemont's Love in the Western World elevates cultural and social obstacles to sex into a universal explanation for romantic feeling; con straints may enliven rather than dead en sexual attraction.
The as yet unpublished diary of Amar Singh, a Rajput nobleman and military officer who produced his "life history" between 1898 and 1942, sug gests that De Rougement's view may be as viable as its opposite. The cultural norms with respect to sexual behavior that Gandhi worked with wcre similar to those prevalent among Rajasthan Rajputs. Numerous daily entries report Amar Singh's vexation at having to wait until midnight when all the adults have gone to bed and cannot witness his approach to his wife's room. He reports his mother's unmasking his circumventions when he tries to visit his wife in the zenana at noon on the pretext of having his dinner there. He reports the elaborate ruses employed to get permission from father or grandfather to visit his wife at her parents' home. His attitude through out is thatof a man faced with a cultural chess problem: how to observe certain forms expressing disinterest in his wife whilc arranging to be with her. The elaborate forms and rhetorical simula tions of disinterest neither affect that interest nor make him believe that it is wicked. The constraints of the cul ture produce no guilt and no disgust. We have no reason to believe that Amar Singh's cheerfulness about sex is any less characteristic of west Indian upper-caste adaptations to a difficult norm than Gandhi's guilty "lust."
Finally,the life history highlights two elements that are not exhausted by culture, role, or psyche: the chance or idiosyncratic event and the realm of meaning that frames a particular kind of activity. An unpredictable event or conjunction-the casting together of two panicular people, as lovers, teach er and student, friends; the creation of a particular human mix in the home, in a circle of friends, or in a hierarchy of aUlhority-provides lheoccasion for Realms of meaning that frame par ticular kinds of activity focus attention on the context of experience by em· phasizing the independent explana· tory significance of the rules and re quirements peculiar to that realm. To accept the validity of art for art's sake, or spon for sport's sake, or science for science's sake is not to argue that the play of social forces in shaping these realms is not also significant, but to accept the possibility that the indi· vidual experience in them can also shape personality and history.
The significance of these twO e1e· mems that lie hetween culture and psyche becomes plain when we ask what the outcome for Gandhi's celibacy and asceticism would have been if Kasturba had liked her husband, thought him a charming friend, and liked going to bed with him. It seems at least plausible that Gandhi's radical dichotomizing of love and lust was as situational as it was cultural in origin, arising proximately out of the particu lar conjunction of Kasturba and Mo handas in the realm of sex. He and his wife plainly did not get on as adolescents; there was nothing be· tween them but "lust." If he was eager to "dominate" her, it was partly because mutuality was ruled out. The Amar Singh diary suggests that this outcome was by no means a necessary conse quence of the cultural norms that Amar Singh and Gandhi shared. Amar Singh provides extensive evidence-of a delicately indirect SOrt, to be sure that he and his wife were delighted with each other. The particular con junction of Amar Singh and his wife in the realm of sex taught him different lessons than Gandhi. Lecturing to a young friend a few years after his marriage about love in the married state, Amar Singh Stresses the great importance of keeping a wife sexually happy. Mutuality rather than domi nance, at least in the realm of affect, is central. Some of his attitudes, it is apparent, come from the more liber ated versions of Victorian literature lhal he reads. nOlably the extraor- Mandelbaum's scholarly synthesis of discussions of the life history method is valuable and fair. But has the contri bution of life histories to anthropology and the social sciences been disap pointingly minor primarily because of the absence of a suitable conceptual scheme, as Mandelbaum claims, and are his own proposals with respect to dimensions, turnings, and adaptations a major step toward the provision of such a scheme? I have my doubts on both scores.
Life histories have been effectively used to complement ethnographic de scription with idiographic portrayal, from the "inside," of what it is like to participate in a particular culture. For this purpose, a conceptual scheme is important only as a presentational scaffolding and as a scanning device to encourage representativeness of coverage. Mandelbaum's proposed scheme, as illustrated in the case of Gandhi, serves that purpose well. It is probably even an improvement on other schemes that have been used.
Life histories have not been used, however, for systematic empirical comparative analysis. Facilitating such analysis would be a major potential value of a general.purpose conceptual framework for the life hislOry. I doubt 203 its practicality. Not only are there large obstacles in the way of attaining ade quate and comparable data on ade quate samples, but there is question in principle as to whether useful "etic" analysis is feasible for something as inherently "emic" as human Jives, ex cept in specificaJly defined realms or in regard to specifically focused ques tions. An example of effective "etic" treatment of aspects of qualitative life history data for psychological purposes may be found in Block (1971) .
If we are asked to consider Mandel baum's scheme as more than a conve nient scaffolding, I see problems in his proposed "dimensions." There are the usual ambiguities in distinguishing the cultural and the social-slightly different angles of perspective, I should think, rather than separable areas of coment. Further, I would see the "individual" dimension or aspect, with Allport (1937) , as a unique inte gration of all the others, not as an additive residual. Mandelbaum's char acterization of adaptation strikes me as phrased more than 1 like in terms of passive adjustment. It would accord more with the spirit of his undertaking to incorporate Pia get's idea of balance between processes of "accommo dation" and "assimilation" (see Flavell 1963) . I very much like Mandelbaum's concept of turnings.
Mandelbaum has shown the utility of his scheme for organizing a sensitive presentation of a life that has uncom mon interest in its own right. The proof of the pudding, so far as his more ambitious claims are concerned, would be its employment in the com parative analysis of ordinary lives. Brewster Smith doubts that the study of life histories can facilitate systematic comparative analysis. He does allow that life histories can complement eth nographic description and that the suggestions in the paper do provide a presentational scaffolding and scan ningdevice for such complementation. 1£ these ideas do indeed turn out to be lIseful for that purpose, we should all be well content. Smith's main ques tions are about "emie-etic" relations, whether the study of individual lives can contribute significantly to broader analyses and, further, what a compar suggests to me the greater promise of specifically devised and more fully ela borated schemes, not broad, general purpose ones like this.
by ANDRt VARAGNAC Paris, France. 10 IX 72 This paper is both thoughtful and learned. I would only suggest adding to the "cultural dimension" the histori cal aspects of the people's collective praxis (Cipolla 1962) , which react on the aims of its culture. In the present case, one can observe that Gandhi acted among societies in which hand labour was prominent. Such a state of things always favours religious feelings (Varagnac 1972) . Gandhi himself seems to have felt this when he tried to promote the use of the spinning wheel and hand weaving. These days methodological refinement usually involves consideration of sample sizes, sampling procedures, eli citing techniques, statistical control of variables, hypothesis formulation and testing, and other forms of data quality control. Mandelbaum suggests that re finement of concepts and analytical procedures is also basic to good meth odology. The life history can indeed be of scientific value when concepts as well as procedures are well ground ed. Mandelbaum simply reminds us once again that it is, after all, the human individual life that underlies the social and the cultural, playing a ative analysis of ordinary lives would be good for. A reasonable reply to the latter question is the remark by Mintz that one goal of such comparisons woud be "to specify with more confi dence the way individuality plays itself out against terms set by sociocultural forces." That will have to be done, as Smith notes, through more specific and detailed research designs than could be given in the paper, but proce dural suggestions of this kind may be useful, perhaps even necessary, in providing a common starting ground for more incisive analyses.
As for the possibility of construct ingany useful design for the compara tive analysis of life histories, Akiwowo, Buhler, Langness, and Phillips agree that it should be attempted, though they point out some inherent difficul· ties in the attempt. Langness mentions major although not always an easily discernible part in the social and cul tural configurations and processes.
Mandelbaum's three analytic con cepts, dimensions, turnings, and adap tation, seem new only in terms of the extent to which he crystallizes and consciously employs them. His efforts to sharpen the concepts are commend able, and his application of them to the life of Gandhi is insightful. If there is a shortcoming, it is his failure to provide guidelines for using these concepts to elicit information from an informant that will facilitate such anal ysis. Mandelbaum makes a good case for the utility of the concepts in the analysis of already available data; he might have gone on to show us how they can be used to obtain new life history data that lends itself to such treatment. Without procedural guides in the eliciting phase of life history work, we will not be able to avoid the trap of providing a good narrative but one lacking a body of concepts. Nor will we be able to make our own life experience as anthropologists some thing more than a phase in our own fieldwork upbringing. Without greater procedural refinement, there can be no such "deliberate phase" of the life history research enterprise as Mandel baum envisions.
I have one other question that Man delbaum does not quite anwer for me. His example emphasizes the value of an atypical case. What of the typical Jives, the ones we might be more apt to deal with in the daily run of our experiences with informants? Do the same procedures apply, or are the only cases to which we can apply this analyt ical approach the atypical ones? the perennial problem of combining the idiographic with the nomothetic and of reconciling an emphasis on the influence of the individual with the more common anthropological pre· sentation of the "inexorable march of events." Ames notes that many anthro· pologists "back into" the dilemma of how to reconcile a positivist, scientific model with a particularistic, historical ethnographic mode of analysis. He finds that the first part of the paper conveys the impression that the gener alizing model is the only valid one but that the later sections on Gandhi's life weave together the two approaches and combine them usefully. The es sence of a sound conceptual design in this matter, Ames indicates, is in the combining of the two rather than in the transformation of the one into the other. 1 would add that creating this CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY combination and maintaining the in terplay is a continuing anthropological concern, whether so aniculated or not. How to abstract the general from the particular, how to illumine the partic ular from the perspective of the gen eral, is not only a basic butan unending question. The answers that may do at one time or for one enquiry may not suffice for other research circum stances. What is conStant is the need to make a clear determination on this question that meets the needs of one's research purpose.
An important aspect of this is the sequence of presentation. Mintz states that the recorder must have substantial prior knowledge of the person's socio cultural setting if he is to reveal the distinctive individual quality of the life history. The anthropologist, Mintz continues, assumes that culture and society provide some man-made order within which the individual functions. In other words, both the writer and his readers have first to learn about the cultural and social forces that have influenced the individual before they can confidently assess how he manipu lated these forces and met them with creative response. Before we can ade quately understand what is unusual and atypical about a life history we must gain some idea of what is regular and typical.
This idea applies also to Susanne and Lloyd Rudolph's remarks on the im ponance of "historical accident." Be fore we can gauge what has been accidental, we must have some notion of what is not accident. In this assess ment a good deal depends on how one defines accident. Was the original invi tation to go to South Africa an acci dent? In some lights it was, in others it was not. The road mishap that Gandhi reports his father to have suf fered may have been a traffic accident, but the nature of Gandhi's recollection of it may have been less accidental.
The Rudolphs see in the presenta tion of social and cultural dimensions an implicit counterargument against their own account that stresses the idiosyncratic in Gandhi's early life. I had not thought of it in that way at all, but rather as an illustrative example and a possibly useful supplement to the several fine studies of Gandhi, including their own. As they indicate, I did not know of the book by Devane sen, and did not use a number of interesting writings that have appeared since the paper was completed. The Rudolphs note that the paper "does not sufficiently recognize autonomous realms of meaning and action, realms that can transcend culture, society, and psyche and in so doing explain the why and how of personality and histoVol. 14 . No.3' June 1973 ry." Such realms sound entlcmg, but we need a bit more explanation of what and where they are.
The Rudolphs also find that the paper appears to favor the view that personality is primarily the product of rules and roles. The intention, if not the outcome, was to present life history study as a heuristic corrective to ex treme views of this kind. Like Ames, the Rudolphs point out an inconsis tency between the methodological and the case history sections of the paper, but do so for quite opposite reasons; they find the methodology part rea sonable but the case analysis oversocial ized, Ames finds the methodology too positivistic and the case presentation to be a useful combination of the two approaches.
A number of the comments raise questions about selection-of the per son to be studied, of the data to be emphasized, of the concepts to be ap plied. On the selection of persons, Phillips cogently tells of the difference between compiling the life history of an ordinary person through direct in terviews and writing the life history of an extraordinary person out of a vast array of published sources. Rele vant to this is a remark by Mintz. The criticism about the special relation be tween interviewer and subject distort ing a life history account, he notes, seems less substantial when the inter· pretation is based on published mate rials. Mintz adds that if he were to follow up on the life history he has published, he would want to collect perhaps a dozen life histories from persons of similar sociocultural char acteristics. While a dozen might not satisfy some standards for an adequate sample, a dozen studies would un doubtedly further enrich Mintz's per ceptive analysis of the single life histo ry.
Both ordinary and extraordinary persons are worth study; what can be learned from the lives of the one kind should illumine our understanding of the other. Waddell asks whether the same procedural suggestions can be applied in the study of typical lives; my opinion is that, in general, they can. Although Langness says that the lives of ordinary men probably do not involve so many or such obvious turn ings as the lives of extraordinary per sons, surely all adults have experienced turnings and have made adaptations, some of the unrenowned perhaps as much as the renowned. Waddell's re quest for guidelines in eliciting life history data is not fully met in the existing literature, but Langness's monograph discusses the matter and Mancklbaum: THt.: STUDY OF LIFE HISTORY: GANDHI provides bibliographic leads to other sources.
Phillips asks whether the data on Gandhi and the analysis might have been significantly changed if I had interviewed Gandhi or had worked with him as closely as, say, Nirmal Bose did. The idea of trying to get life history data from Gandhi did cross my mind, as I recall, but was promptly crossed out when I remembered that my mail and movements were evident ly being closely watched and that a foreigner who showed interest in Indi· an political figures at the tense junc ture of the British Raj was not likely to remain in India for long.
Akiwowo's comments on the selec tion of data deal with some basic issues. He notes that any life history study involves some selection and that the paper seeks a general framework for analysis so that there may be more common procedural ground and com· parability among life history studies than there has been so far. But Akiwowo finds the sections on Gandhi to reflect "the author's own concerns." Perhaps the central question here is whether these procedural concerns are broad and cogent enough to be shared by other students of life history and also inclusive enough to allow for dif ferences in culture and personality, bothof the subjects and of the authors.
The personal bent of the anthro pologist is of special importance in life history studies, Mintz writes, such stu dies having "always said a great deal about the anthropologist, and not only about his subject." True enough, but this is a matter of degree, since a good deal of anthropological writing also tells something about the author, as the variety of the comments on papers in this journal attests. Mintz recom mends that one who records and inter prets a life history do his best 10 make clear what he thinks he is like. A few anthropologists have tried to do so, and it is useful information, though the reader still has the problem of interpreting the author's interpreta tion of himself.
In anthropological as well as in other writings, the selection of data is likely to be influenced by the intellectual currents of the author's time and place. Haydu and Langness mention the al ternation between emphasis on the influence of the great individual and insistence on the inexorable power of anonymous social forces. Greenstein notes that it is fashionable in the social sciences to stress that role require ments mitigate personal qualities, al though many political roles do leave room for personal qualities to affect 205 behavior. Fashions in this change in different ways in different fields and societies. In the novel, Solzhenitsyn has recently written what critics take to be a challenge to Tolstoy's view of the dominance of social forces. In political journalism, Fitzgerald and Halberstam have wrinen about the American in volvement in Vietnam in ways that emphasize cultural and social forces. The further development of life histo ry studies in anthropology could pro vide a perspective on such issues that would help balance the thinking about them against the vagaries and paro chialisms of short-lived fashions.
On the selection of concepts in the paper, the opinions of the comments vary. Mintz writes that the distinction between social and cultural dimensions is promising; Smith finds it ambiguous. Smith says that he very much likes the concept of turnings; Langness believes both turnings and adaptations would be difficult to use elsewhere. Akiwowo concludes that the approach suggested in the paper is of special value because of its emphasis on man as a creative being; Smith finds the concept of ad aptation too weighted toward passive adjustment. Which of these views are the more cogent remains to be ascer tained by those who may try to apply the proposed approach. It may be that the separation of the cultural and social dimensions does involve awkward am-
